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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON FISCAL STRESS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IN STATE 
GOVERNMENT FINANCE 
 
State government finance is a substantial endeavor in the United States.  The 
management of a multitude of revenues and expenditures often involves some level of 
fiscal stress.  In an age of increased public scrutiny, policymakers must be mindful of 
possible causes of fiscal stress, and the policy options available to mitigate fiscal stress 
and increase financial stability.  This dissertation contains three essays that examine 
different elements of fiscal stress, and in some cases, the applicable policy responses.   
 
Chapter two examines rainy day funds and their countercyclical goal of reducing 
recessionary fiscal stress.  This essay takes a different approach from much of the 
literature, by using forecast residuals to quantify fiscal stress as tax revenue volatility and 
searching for any relationship between rainy day funds and states that had greater 
volatility.  Empirical results indicate states that experience positive residuals, that is 
actual tax revenues greater than the forecast trend line, had greater rainy day fund 
balances. 
 
Chapter three focuses on the problem of lost revenues facing states from e-commerce.  
Due to Supreme Court decisions, businesses that do not have a physical location, or 
nexus, in a state are not required to collect sales and use taxes.  To date, the policy 
response to lost revenue that has gained the most traction is the Streamlined Sales and 
Use Tax Agreement.  Results indicate that states with local option sales taxes and higher 
sales tax rates were more likely to adopt this agreement.  
 
Chapter four scrutinizes state unemployment trust funds, which are used to fund state 
unemployment insurance programs.  If state funds run short of money during recessions 
due to the larger number of individuals drawing benefits, then states must borrow from 
the federal government’s unemployment trust fund.  This creates another liability that 
must be managed by state governments.  Empirical findings show that several features of 
programs affect balances and the probability of taking a loan from the federal fund 
including the taxable wage base, weekly benefits, and unemployment tax rates.  This 
 
 
dissertation concludes by summarizing the results and exploring future research 
possibilities on the three essay topics. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 State Government Finance 
 
 State government finance is a substantial enterprise in the United States, with 
state governments taking in over $2 trillion in revenues from taxes, charges, and 
intergovernmental transfers in 2010.1  Managing such a wide array of revenue sources 
and expenditures is, at times, going to involve some level of fiscal stress.  In addition to 
budgeting revenues and expenditures, state governments also engage in debt 
management. 2,3  In 2010, outstanding state debt totaled over $1.1 trillion, while new state 
debt was issued in the amount of $55 billion.  Selected recent cumulative state 
government financial data is shown in Figure 1.1, in 2010 constant dollars.  The figure 
reveals that total and tax revenues both experience declines during recessions, while 
expenditures and debt outstanding appear to be linearly increasing during the time period. 
 The importance of managing fiscal stress in the public sector is heightened in an 
age of growing information dissemination and public interest.  In this environment, state 
government finance has faced increased scrutiny.  Some of this has emerged from a 
growing emphasis on transparency4 and the sensible use of public funds.  Regardless, 
policymakers must be cognizant of current threats and emerging fiscal issues facing state 
governments.   
 
1 Source: Census Bureau's Annual Survey of State Government Finances. 
2 Details on each state's budgeting can be found in the National Association of State Budget Officers' 
(NASBO) 2008 report on Budget Processes in the States. 
3 For more on state debt management policies and practices see Hackbart and Leigland (1990) and Robbins 
and Dungan (2001). 
4 Several states have established transparency offices or centers designed to provide more public access to 
details on government functions.   
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Figure 1.1: Selected Aggregate State Government Financial Statistics 
 
Source: Census Bureau's Annual Survey of State Government Finances 
This dissertation contains three essays analyzing different elements of fiscal stress that 
face state governments and in some instances, how governments have responded in an 
attempt to increase financial stability.  The three essays analyze rainy day funds, 
adoptions of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, and state unemployment 
trust funds.  This chapter serves to broadly introduce the context that frames the three 
essays in the dissertation. 
 
1.2 Fiscal Stress in State Government Finance  
 
The management of the myriad of funding sources, expenditure streams, and debt 
is a complex endeavor and as such it can lead to fiscal stress.  Such fiscal issues that face 
state government finances can arise out of recessions as well as long term structural 
budget issues.  The threat from recessions has been plainly evident in recent years due to 
the Great Recession, which has put increased pressure on state budgets as revenues have 
fallen precipitously.  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, enacted in 2009, 
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directed some funding to states in order to help close budget gaps (Radnofsky, 2009).  
This is more of a short term measure, and concerns have been raised about how quickly 
transfers can be disbursed and how such resources should be targeted (Wildasin, 2009).  
Despite this infusion of cash, states are still managing a smaller pool of revenues with a 
greater demand for expenditures.  This has forced state budgeters to make difficult 
choices due to the balanced budget requirements facing 49 states, with the exception of 
Vermont.5  The visibility of state finances and rash of fiscal woes that permeated news 
reports during and even after the Great Recession highlighted the importance of prudent 
financial management.  Still, concerns about the health of state government finances have 
persisted due to the plight of some local governments that have recently filed for 
bankruptcy.  The problems facing Jefferson County, Alabama, and Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania6  have raised worries about financial ills spreading to other levels of 
government. 
The cyclical nature of finances at the state (and local) level is a seemingly 
inevitable event, though pinpointing the occurrences, depth, and length of such cyclical 
events remains an inexact science.  The Great Recession's effect on state finances can be 
viewed as a business cycle event, albeit with a deeper trough than historical averages 
might have indicated.  Yet, given the depth and length of the recession, long term 
financial ramifications for states are possible.  Concern over fiscal gaps and their long 
term impacts on state budgets did not arise solely out of the Great Recession, but have 
been analyzed in previous recessions as well (Giertz & Giertz, 2004; Garrett & Wagner, 
2004).  Still, fiscal stress in state government finance does not arise exclusively out of 
5 Information on balanced budget requirements is available in the National Conference of State Legislators' 
fiscal brief on State Balanced Budget Provisions. 
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recessions, but can be the result of future liabilities that reveal structural financial 
problems.  These types of issues reveal that long term structural risks are present in state 
government finances and do not necessarily dissipate with an improving economic 
situation.   
 There are multiple elements of fiscal stress that deserve examination in the 
context of state government finances.  A number of the more prominent causes of fiscal 
stress for state governments have been well chronicled, both in the news media and the 
literature.  Decreased revenues as a result of the Great Recession and continuing 
economic woes have been documented by many (see for example: Dadayan and Boyd, 
2010; McNichol, Oliff, & Johnson, 2012).  Future liabilities such as increasing debt 
levels (Maguire, 2011; Chappatta, 2012; Luhby, 2010) and underfunded pensions (Pew 
Center on the States, 2010) have also been highlighted.  State policy responses to the 
various elements of fiscal stress that have presented themselves are also relevant, as they 
indicate the level of concern from policymakers and ostensibly the level of risk aversion 
in state governments and the citizenry.  The dissertation seeks to broaden the 
understanding of some aspects of fiscal stress that face state governments.  
Understanding the impacts and reasons that fiscal stress arises in government finance, as 
well as examining possible ways to increase financial stability by managing it, can 
provide policy makers with an increasing base of knowledge regarding the fiscal issues 
they face.  This awareness can enable policy makers to make better informed financial 
management decisions. 
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1.3 Organization of the Dissertation 
 
 After this brief introduction, the following chapters examine three topics relating 
to state government finance and fiscal stress.  The three topics cover the link between 
rainy day funds and a state’s budgetary environment, the adoption of the Streamlined 
Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA) in response to revenue losses from e-commerce, 
and unemployment insurance trust fund solvency.  In the case of rainy day funds and the 
SSUTA, the analysis focuses on a policy response.  Unemployment trust fund solvency 
analysis focuses on determinants that lead to insolvency, and ostensibly, what policy 
changes are available to increase financial stability in these funds.  Although the 
dissertation is limited to analyzing three topics on fiscal stress, there are certainly others 
that deserve careful examination in order to provide a thorough foundation for 
understanding the risks facing state government finance and some of the policies used to 
combat them. 
 The first essay is entitled, "Rainy Day Funds and Own Source Tax Revenues: Do 
States Utilize Reserve Funds as a Response to Tax Revenue Volatility?", and examines 
rainy day funds and the role they play in reducing the fiscal stress that can arise due to 
declining revenues that states generally face during a recession.  This essay 
acknowledges the well-chronicled risk of revenue shortfalls that can face states during a 
recession.  The focus here is on a tool that states can use to mitigate the problem of 
revenue shortfalls, and whether or not states take into account the level of fiscal stress 
they face, represented by revenue volatility, when determining fund balances.  Much of 
the literature on rainy day funds has focused on finding optimal fund sizes or studying the 
effectiveness of rainy day funds as countercyclical budget tools.  This essay takes a 
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different approach, by comparing revenue volatility with fund balances to determine if 
states with more risky environments prepare accordingly.   
The essay on the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement adoption, "E-
Commerce Taxation: Analyzing Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement Adoption by 
the States," introduces the problem of lost revenues facing states from e-commerce.  Due 
to Supreme Court decisions, businesses that do not have a physical location, or nexus, in 
a state are not required to collect sales and use taxes.  Estimates of the losses from online 
sales can be significant and put states at greater risk, particularly when state budgeters are 
grappling with insufficient revenues.  The problem of taxing online sales is explored in 
detail in this essay and the issue has spurred many proposals for reform.  To date, the 
proposal that has gained the most traction is the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax, which 
has been adopted by 24 states.  This agreement simplifies tax bases and rates in order to 
encourage businesses to collect taxes.   Analysis in this essay is focused on characteristics 
of adopting states in order to determine what prompted states to join or not to join this 
agreement.   
 The final essay on unemployment trust funds, "Unemployment Insurance Trust 
Fund Solvency: An Analysis of Balances and State Management Practices," focuses on 
the solvency of state unemployment insurance trust funds.  Fund balances will be 
compared to various characteristics of the state unemployment insurance programs and 
state economic factors to determine what affects fund balances.  Building up fund 
balances during times of economic growth is a key element to maintaining the solvency 
of unemployment insurance funds during recessions.  If state funds run short of money 
during recessions due to the larger number of individuals drawing benefits, then states 
6 
 
must borrow from the federal government’s unemployment insurance trust fund.  This 
creates a liability that must be managed by state governments.  If this liability is not 
repaid within a certain time period, interest penalties and automatic changes to the state’s 
unemployment program will occur.  The frequency with which states have to borrow 
from the federal government is also analyzed to determine if certain characteristics make 
some states' trust funds more vulnerable.  To conclude the dissertation the findings from 
each essay are reviewed and discussed in the context of fiscal stress.   The policy 
implications of the findings are also discussed, with suggestions for possible future 
research on the overarching topic of fiscal stress and financial stability in state 
government finance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © James Bryan Gibson 2013
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Rainy Day Funds and Own Source Tax Revenues: Do States Utilize Reserve Funds 
as a Response to Tax Revenue Volatility? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Revenue shortfalls and resulting budget gaps that arise during recessions are a 
seemingly inevitable part of state government finance.  States experiencing revenue 
shortfalls are generally faced with unpleasant choices: either raise revenues, cut 
expenditures, or utilize temporary solutions such as changing accounting methods or 
assumptions used in budgeting.7  The risk to state fiscal health from declining revenues 
during recessions emerges each time the business cycle trends downward.  States have 
responded in recent decades by establishing rainy day funds to provide increased 
financial stability.  Rainy day funds, also known as budget stabilization funds, provide a 
more palatable option to help states balance their budgets due to balanced budget 
requirements that face all states with the exception of Vermont.8  This can help states 
avoid worst case scenarios, such as across the board expenditure cuts that can hinder 
public service provision.  The concept behind these funds is that states can save excess 
revenues during times of economic growth and prosperity in order to cover budget gaps 
that arise due to declining tax revenues during economic downturns.  In essence, these 
funds enable states to use countercyclical planning to reduce the risk that a recessionary 
shock may lead to unfavorable budget outcomes, which does require the foresight to plan 
accordingly (Schunk & Woodward, 2005).  As such, these funds are generally used to 
7 For a discussion of some of the alternative methods used to balance state budgets see Vasche and 
Williams (1987) p.67-68. 
8 For other possible uses of rainy day funds see Hou (2004). 
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address cyclical economic effects rather than structural issues, although reluctance among 
policymakers to utilize rainy day funds can exacerbate cyclical deficits (Zahradnik & 
Johnson, 2002).  Rainy day funds can reduce the fiscal stress from revenue volatility and 
uncertainty in the budgetary process, particularly regarding possible cuts to public 
services or changes to tax structures.9  Over the long run they can also help states smooth 
budget processes (Levinson, 1998; Knight & Levinson, 1999; Wagner & Elder, 2005; 
Schunk & Woodward, 2005), avoid “revenue ratcheting”10 (Gold, 1995; Navin and 
Navin, 1997), reduce bond yields (Wagner, 2004), and boost credit ratings (Grizzle, 
2010).  Although they may not completely fill budget gaps or produce all of these desired 
results (Gold, 1984), rainy day funds are a fiscal institution with real significance.  The 
balances that states choose to keep in their funds and the relationship between fund levels 
and fiscal stress, defined in this essay as tax revenue volatility, should reveal if rainy day 
funds are being used for their intended purpose.  The research question and organization 
of this essay are introduced in the following two sub-sections. 
 
2.1.1 Research Question 
 
The use of rainy day funds as a financial stability tool, and correspondingly the 
appropriate level of reserves to maintain, has been discussed in the literature and by 
practitioners without any consensus.  Much of the focus centers on determining what 
constitutes an optimally sized rainy day fund and how these funds affect savings 
behavior, not the connection between fund balances and fiscal stress.  This essay takes a 
relatively unexplored approach by examining whether there is any relationship between 
9 Some states have prioritized expenditures in order to protect programs considered to be the most 
important in the even of a budget shortfall that requires spending cuts (Jordan, 2006). 
10 Occurs when taxes are raised during a recession on a “short term” basis to plug budget gaps, yet when 
the recession ends the taxes remain as part of a new revenue base, hence the term “revenue ratcheting”. 
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fund balances in the states that have a rainy day fund and their budgetary situation.  The 
research question is as follows: do states utilize rainy day funds as a response to tax 
revenue volatility?  It would be expected that states with greater rainy day funds would 
be those with more revenue volatility and those that have historically been more 
vulnerable to recessions, thus there is an underlying assumption of risk aversion. 
 
2.1.2 Essay Organization 
 
 This essay on rainy day funds provides some historical context on funds and 
balances, discusses the literature, and uses a comprehensive data set for empirical 
analysis.  Section two contains background information on funds and how they are 
structured as well as numbers on aggregate state rainy day fund balances over time.  
Section three discusses the literature including studies on the effectiveness of funds, 
optimal fund sizes, and how the presence of funds impacts state savings behavior.  
Section four discusses the data and appropriate empirical approaches to answering the 
research question and section five concludes by examining the policy implications and 
impacts on rainy day fund management. 
 
2.2 Background  
 
Rainy day funds have become a common fiscal institution in a majority of states 
11 with many adoptions occurring after the 1980-1982 recession spawned a number of 
fiscal crises (Douglas & Gaddie, 2001), although the effects of this recession on directly 
spurring adoptions is questioned by Wagner and Sobel (2006).  The number of states that 
had funds rose from 12 to 38 by 1989, and up to 44 states by 1994 (Sobel & Holcombe, 
1996).  Today, every state with the exception of Kansas and Montana has a rainy day 
11 For more on local government reserves and rainy day funds see Wolkoff (1987) and Tyer (1993). 
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fund, with Alabama, Arkansas, and Oregon implementing funds in recent years.  
Although general fund surpluses can also be maintained as a buffer, they are not 
governed by specific provisions, and thus may not be as reliable a savings mechanism.  
Rainy day fund balances vary widely across states as illustrated in the following figures.  
Figure 2.1 shows rainy day fund balances as a percentage of annual expenditures in 2000, 
excluding Alaska and Hawaii.  In 2000, Alaska had a rainy day fund balance equivalent 
to 41 percent of expenditures while Hawaii had a balance equal to 0.1 percent of 
expenditures.  Alaska in particular is an outlier due in large part to its funding sources 
from natural resource taxes.  It is worth nothing that in 2000, Kansas, Montana, Oregon, 
Alabama, and Arkansas did not have rainy day funds.  Some of the leaders in fund 
balances in 2000 included California, Massachusetts, and Minnesota. 
 
Figure 2.1: State Rainy Day Fund Balances as a Percentage of Expenditures, 2000 
 
Source: National Association of State Budget Officers 2000 Fiscal Survey, U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual 
Survey of State Government Finances 2000 
 
Rainy day fund balances in 2005 are displayed in Figure 2.2.  In 2005, Alaska had a 
balance of just over 28 percent while Hawaii was at 0.6 percent.  States that did not have 
11 
 
a rainy day fund in 2000 did not establish one by 2005, thus they all have balances of 
zero.  The leaders in fund balances shifted somewhat, although many states with high 
balances in 2000 also maintained those through 2005.  States with the highest rainy day 
fund balances in 2005 included Wyoming and New Mexico, both of which saw 
substantial increases from 2000. 
 
Figure 2.2: State Rainy Day Fund Balances as a Percentage of Expenditures, 2005 
 
Source: National Association of State Budget Officers 2005 Fiscal Survey, U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual 
Survey of State Government Finances 2005 
 
The composition of the map does change significantly from 2005 to 2010.  These shifts 
are likely the result of fiscal stress from the Great Recession, with several states’ funds 
entirely depleted at the end of 2010.  Figure 2.3 shows current state rainy day fund 
balances as a percentage of expenditures in 2010.  Alaska and Hawaii are not shown on 
the graph.  Alaska has become even more of an outlier, with a rainy day fund balance of 
over 94 percent.  Hawaii had a balance of 0.6 percent in 2010.  Other states are shown in 
the figure and as can be seen there are many states with balances of zero, excluding 
Kansas and Montana, which do not have a rainy day fund.  Alabama and Oregon 
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established funds in 2008, while Arkansas’s fund was established in 2010, thus it has a 
balance of zero in the figure.  States including Texas, Wyoming, and North Dakota all 
were among the leaders in fund balances in 2010. 
 
Figure 2.3: State Rainy Day Fund Balances as a Percentage of Expenditures, 2010 
 
Source: National Association of State Budget Officers 2010 Fiscal Survey, U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual 
Survey of State Government Finances 2010 
 
 If cumulative state rainy day fund balances are examined over time there is a 
pattern of funds being drawn down during a recession, and then increasing steadily after 
the recession has ended.  Figure 2.4 illustrates aggregate rainy day fund balances from 
1984 to 2010.  As more states adopted funds, balances rapidly increased, reaching a 
height of nearly $35 billion dollars in 2000.  Fund balances do appear to peak prior to 
recessions, indicating that states are utilizing them to manage fiscal stress. 
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Figure 2.4: Aggregate State Rainy Day Fund Balances 
 
Source: National Association of State Budget Officers Bi-annual Fiscal Surveys, Various Years 
 
 Another common measure used to examine rainy day funds is fund balances taken 
as a percentage of annual expenditures, which is shown in Figure 2.5 from 1984 to 2010, 
and the trend is quite similar to Figure 2.4.  Both nominal and real 2010 dollars are 
shown.  Fund balances do appear to peak prior to recessions, indicating that states are 
utilizing them to mitigate the effects of recessions.  The recession of the early 1990s led 
to a decline in fund balances, as did the 2001 recession.  The Great Recession appears to 
have had some impact on fund balances, but this effect is likely muted due to the federal 
transfers authorized by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2008.  It is 
probable that these transfers delayed rainy day fund withdrawals, which if they had 
occurred, would have likely had a much greater impact on fund balances than is seen in 
the data. 
 
 
$0
$5,000
$10,000
$15,000
$20,000
$25,000
$30,000
$35,000
$40,000
19
84
19
87
19
90
19
93
19
96
19
99
20
02
20
05
20
08
M
ill
io
ns
 o
f d
ol
la
rs
Nominal dollars
Real dollars
14 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Aggregate State Rainy Day Fund Balances as a Percentage of 
Expenditures 
 
Source: National Association of State Budget Officers Bi-annual Fiscal Surveys, Various Years 
 
 
2.3 Literature Review 
 
 
2.3.1 Rainy Day Fund Structure, Governance, and Effectiveness 
 
As rainy day funds have been adopted by many states and balances have grown, 
the structure and governance of these funds has become increasingly important to 
understanding the role they play in state budgeting.  Several key factors can differentiate 
funds including if a state has: caps on fund size, withdrawal rules, deposit rules, 
replenishment rules, or whether the fund was statutorily or constitutionally established.  
Table A.1 in Appendix A lists the various characteristics of state rainy day funds and 
identifies how each fund is structured.12  Fund structure and governance mechanisms 
(Hou, 2004) can affect a fund’s size and effectiveness at reducing fiscal stress (Sobel & 
12 Hou (2004) also provides an in-depth examination of fund design features. 
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Holcombe, 1996; Douglas & Gaddie, 2002; Wagner & Elder, 2005; McNichol & 
Filipowich, 2007).  A study of seven Midwestern states and their rainy day funds found 
differences among funds based on how the fund size was determined, the way in which 
funds were deposited, and the mechanisms for fund withdrawals (Navin & Navin, 1997).  
Ensuring funds are appropriately structured according to state budgeting preferences will 
enable states to effectively make and execute choices on preferred savings methods in 
budgeting.   
Some of the literature on rainy day funds has studied how effective rainy day 
funds have been to date at alleviating fiscal stress13 during recessions.  The use of rainy 
day funds as an effective countercyclical fiscal tool in place of general fund surpluses 
points to the increasing importance of reserve funds in the budgeting process (Hou, 2005; 
Hou, 2006).  If states with a rainy day fund were also able to reduce fiscal stress, then the 
merit of maintaining such a fund as a financial stability tool becomes clearer.  Analyses 
of the early 1990’s recession revealed that states with a rainy day fund, particularly those 
with mandatory deposit requirements, had a significant reduction in fiscal stress during 
the recession (Sobel & Holcombe, 1996; Douglas & Gaddie, 2002).  Furthermore, 
Levinson (1998) finds evidence that states using rainy day funds as countercyclical fiscal 
planning tools experienced less volatile economic fluctuations than did states without a 
fund.  As rainy day funds have been shown to be effective at reducing fiscal stress, it is 
apt to describe them as a fiscal institution with real significance for state budgeters.    
One final subject that merits a brief discussion is the concept of tax and 
expenditure smoothing, and the importance that rainy day funds can have on these issues.  
13 Often defined in the literature as the sum of expenditure shortfalls and tax increases as a percentage of 
general expenditures (Sobel & Holcombe, 1996; Douglas & Gaddie, 2002). 
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Tax smoothing is generally regarded as a concept that tax rates should be equalized over 
time, while expenditure smoothing seeks to maintain a constant level (or incremental 
increase) in expenditures over time.  Expenditure smoothing relies on savings such as 
rainy day funds to maintain expenditure levels during downturns in the business cycle 
(Knight & Levinson, 1999; Sobel & Holcombe, 1996; Wolkoff, 1987).  Barro’s (1979) 
seminal piece on tax smoothing found that governments may smooth tax rates given 
expected permanent spending.  This permanent level of spending is interrupted at times 
by changes in spending either from deficits or surpluses.  Essentially, a permanent 
increase or decrease in government spending should be accompanied by a tax increase or 
decrease of equal proportion (Alesina & Perotti, 1995; Lucas & Stokey, 1983).  Given the 
balanced budget rules faced by states, there is some disagreement on whether tax 
smoothing occurs at the state level, or is more a federal phenomenon.  Hypothetically, if 
tax or expenditure smoothing did occur at the state level then rainy day funds could 
contribute to the smoothing.  During times of fiscal stress when states need to balance 
their budgets, rainy day funds can provide an alternative to raising tax rates or decreasing 
expenditures. 
There are several additional strands of literature that build a foundation for this 
study.  However, without the initial evidence provided by the literature discussed 
previously, analyzing the effects of rainy day funds on financial stability becomes much 
less practical.  Ultimately, states must determine the right level of reserves to maintain 
and whether their rainy day fund is the appropriate savings vehicle to manage fiscal 
stress, or even target tax smoothing if that is a policy goal.  The next two sections on 
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target fund size and savings effects build the case for the analysis of states and the size of 
their rainy day funds. 
 
2.3.2 Target Fund Size 
 
A key question for policymakers is how much to save in a rainy day fund.  
Developing a target fund size should, theoretically, involve analyzing past data to 
determine how volatile a state’s budgetary situation has been in past years.  Thus, states 
that have been more vulnerable to economic shocks like a recession would have greater 
balances than other states.  The Government Finance Officers Association (2009) 
recommends that governments maintain an unreserved fund balance of one to two months 
of expenditures, or five to fifteen percent of annual expenditures in their general fund.  
Standard and Poor’s (2000) considers overall fund balances, including excess general 
fund and rainy day fund balances, of five percent or less to be “low” while those over 
fifteen percent to be “strong”.  Yet, five percent of general fund expenditures is often 
cited14 as a measuring stick for appropriate rainy day fund size.  While the five percent 
metric may be adequate for some states, using such an approach across all states is flawed 
because it does not account for a number of variables that may differ between states15 
(Joyce, 2001; Lav & Berube, 1999; Zahradnik & Ribeiro, 2003).  Despite this, 16 states 
have a cap of five percent or less on their rainy day fund sizes.  Caps are not the only 
mechanism that can influence fund size, as other elements of fund structure such as 
deposit and withdrawal rules, also impact fund size (Hou, 2004).  No two states are 
exactly alike when it comes to politics and economics and the degree to which they 
14 Navin and Navin (1997) cite National Conference of State Legislators documents that refer to “Wall 
Street analysts” who recommend a fund size of five percent. 
15 See Kriz (2003) for an analysis of local governments where he determines that 5% is “likely to be 
inadequate” for local governments as well. 
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mirror the national business cycle.  Similarly, reliance on various forms of revenues can 
lead to different results.  Some states may rely more on income taxes and others more on 
sales taxes.  Additionally, the varying rates and elasticities of taxes compound the 
differences across states.  Even states with similar tax portfolios often experience 
different outcomes in the business cycle (Suyderhound, 1994).   
Several researchers have recommended different minimum fund balances (as a 
percentage of expenditures) for state rainy day funds, from the five percent benchmark to 
18 percent (Lav & Berube, 1999) to 30 percent (Sobel & Holcombe, 1996).  Sobel and 
Holcombe (1996) estimated the rainy day fund size for states that would have allowed 
them to weather the economic downturns from 1989 to 1992.  Their state estimates 
ranged from five percent to 50 percent, with a nationwide average of 30 percent.  The 
authors do suggest the possibility that states pool their reserve funds in a joint effort.  
Such a measure would reduce the nationwide average to slightly over 16 percent.  Joyce's 
(2001) analysis of state rainy day funds did not specifically prescribe an optimal size or 
any measure to calculate one.  Rather, he cites a number of unique factors that should 
influence the optimal size of a rainy day fund and that using a “one size fits all” approach 
does not account for variability between states.  Joyce analyzes state rainy day funds by 
comparing balances with an index of volatility.16  He then draws the following 
conclusion: “It should be obvious that, in the vast majority of cases, there is little or no 
relationship between the current size (as of 1997) of rainy day funds and the volatility of 
a state’s budget environment” (p. 85).  This observation reveals that many states were not 
16 Summation of a number of measures that examine volatility; measures include revenues from corporate 
taxes, changes in unemployment, reliance on federal aid, reliance on gambling revenue, and Medicaid 
expenditures; each individual measure is assigned a scale from 1 to 5 with less volatile=1 and more 
volatile=5. 
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using their rainy day funds at a level that was proportionate to their budgetary and 
economic environments. 
Several case studies provide more support for not utilizing a “one size fits all” 
approach to fund size.  Vasche and Williams (1987) used California as a case study on 
rainy day funds and found that five percent of general expenditures was a reasonable 
target for California at that time.  Their analysis concluded that a rainy day fund of 10 
percent would be sufficient for California in the event of an economic downturn, and that 
three percent would be an adequate buffer against revenue forecasting errors, thus they 
settled on five percent as a sufficient mid-range fund size.  However, other state targets 
may vary depending on probable forecasting errors unique to each state.  A case study of 
Ohio found that five percent would be inadequate based on historical data, and that a 
balance of at least 11 percent of the prior year’s expenditures was needed to effectively 
handle historical budget fluctuations (Navin & Navin, 1997).  Targeting an optimal fund 
size seemed to be an issue for budgeters as the authors note, “In discussions with several 
state budget administrators, there seems to be a lack of specificity and precision in 
determining ideal size of the desired or target level for the stabilization funds” (p. 117).  
They deem that optimal fund size should depend on a number of state level factors, but 
still be large enough to help the state adequately manage an average economic downturn.  
A value at risk (VAR) approach17 is used by Cornia and Nelson (2003) to estimate a 
target rainy day fund size for Utah.  Using 10,000 simulations, the authors determine that 
a rainy day fund comprising three percent of expenditures “would give the state adequate 
revenue to match planned and mandated expenditure 95 percent of the time” (p.567). 
17 Defined by Jorion (2001) as follows: “VAR summarizes the worst loss over a target horizon with a given 
level of confidence.”   
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The issue of state budgeting preferences is a factor that can also influence how 
fund size is determined.  Some initial considerations of state budgeting preferences 
involved in determining rainy day fund size are moral hazard and opportunity cost.  
Moral hazard becomes an issue if politicians do not exercise due diligence and caution 
when budgeting because a substantial rainy day fund already exists.  This problem 
identifies political preferences as an important factor that influences fund sizes 
(Zahradnik & Ribeiro, 2003), although political considerations can prevent an adequate 
fund from being established (Gold, 1995).  Opportunity costs must also be considered 
when a large rainy day fund is being maintained, as questions may arise about the 
wisdom of letting public money sit unused.  It may be prudent for policymakers to 
consider these next best alternative costs because as Cornia and Nelson (2003) note: "The 
opportunity cost of a bloated RDF (rainy day fund) may be substantial" (p.564).  
Additionally, maintaining a large rainy day fund may not be sustainable over time, as 
changes in politics, citizen preferences, and expenditure priorities may change a state's 
desired level of savings.  The optimal size of a state's rainy day fund can also depend on 
how much stability is desired in revenues and expenditures (Gold, 1984).  Gold posits 
that if a state is willing and able to handle fluctuations in its budgetary process, it can 
operate without a rainy day fund, but if a state values stability, then it will establish a 
sufficient rainy day fund.  Finally, Gold (1995) recommends that states should take 
economic volatility as well as their desired tax rate stability into consideration when 
determining the optimal size of their rainy day fund.   
While the literature has made clear that a five percent benchmark for rainy day 
funds is often insufficient, there is no clear cut standard to use when attempting to 
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pinpoint a suitable fund size.  It is, however, readily apparent that states should not all 
have the same fund size due to differences in economies and budget priorities.  This 
would indicate that a state’s rainy day fund size should be determined by its environment, 
with states in more precarious situations needing to establish higher target fund sizes.  
Thus, this essay makes no effort to determine an “optimal or target size”, rather the goal 
is to examine the relationship between fund size and the budgetary environments in the 
states. 
 
2.3.3 Savings Effects 
 
Rainy day funds and their effect on savings and the savings choices made 
regarding funds are another important element to examining rainy day funds in the 
context of fiscal stress and financial stability.  Just as states that had more volatile 
budgetary environments would theoretically have higher target fund sizes because they 
may be more vulnerable to recessions, those same states would be anticipated to have 
greater savings in their rainy day fund.  The effects of rainy day funds on savings 
behavior is explored in some detail in the literature with conflicting evidence being 
offered.   Initial perception of rainy day funds might be that those states that adopted 
rainy day funds would save more.   This may not always be the case as some believe 
rainy day funds are substitutable with general fund surpluses (Wagner, 2003), or used to 
avoid tax and expenditure laws18 (Wagner & Sobel, 2006), thereby mitigating any 
savings effect.   
The adoption of a rainy day fund has proven to increase savings at the outset, 
which may be expected as newly established funds would require some initial level of 
18 For more on tax and expenditure limits see Mullins and Wallin (2004) and Elder (1992). 
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deposits (Knight and Levinson, 1999; Hou & Duncombe, 2008).  Comparisons of states 
with rainy day funds and those without have shown that states with a fund had higher 
overall balances19 (Knight & Levinson, 1999), and that using overall balances provides a 
more complete picture of state savings (Gold, 1995).  Gonzalez and Levinson (2003) 
tracked rainy day fund balances and excess general fund balances and found that general 
fund balances did not decline as rainy day fund balances were built up.  Rather, they 
appear to have grown in tandem, indicating that rainy day funds provided a real savings 
boost.   
Fund structure also influences savings in rainy day funds.  States with a rainy day 
fund that is governed by strict deposit and withdrawal rules had the highest savings gains 
(Sobel & Holcombe, 1996; Knight & Levinson, 1999; Wagner, 2001).  Such savings 
gains are to be expected for states that mandate deposits and have strict rules limiting 
withdrawals only to truly dire situations.  In many ways, the choice regarding savings 
levels is a policy decision unless mandatory deposit mechanisms are in place.  The 
question remains whether states with more risky environments use such mechanisms, or 
leave the determination of savings to policymakers.    
The literature has shown that rainy day funds can reduce fiscal stress and can 
increase savings at the state level, but there remain other issues that need to be addressed 
such as whether states that are more susceptible to fiscal stress maintain balances that 
reflect such vulnerability.  It is clear that rainy day funds have become a widespread 
fiscal institution among the states in the past few decades and can be an important 
budgeting tool.  By enabling states to save excess revenues during times of economic 
growth in a separate fund for use during times of fiscal stress, rainy day funds can 
19 Include both excess general fund balances and rainy day fund balances. 
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provide a savings vehicle for states that can be utilized as a valuable financial stability 
tool to buffer against fiscal stress.  
 
 
2.4 Empirical Analysis 
 
The link between fund balances and the level of fiscal stress facing states has 
gone largely unnoticed in the literature aside from Joyce’s (2001) study.  His analysis of 
data from the early 1990’s led to the development of an index of volatility that was then 
simply compared to fund balances.  Joyce acknowledges this measure as being somewhat 
“crude” and recommends that “scholars might search for the specific relationship 
between a state’s budget volatility and the size of its rainy day fund” (p.87).  The goal of 
the analysis is to analyze if there are any links present between fiscal stress and rainy day 
fund size.  In this context of countercyclical fiscal policy, fiscal stress is most closely 
equated with volatility.  The research question can now be formulated into a hypothesis 
regarding rainy day funds and fiscal stress.   
H1: States with greater rainy day funds are those with more volatile tax revenues. 
The hypothesis is based on the premise that state governments are risk averse and thus 
would maintain some level of reserves to ensure adequacy in the state revenue system 
(Groves & Kahn, 1952).  Volatility in this context can be defined as changes over time, 
that is, changes in a state’s revenues.  Given the many parts that comprise state budgets, it 
is necessary to utilize broader measures in order to try and capture the effects of overall 
volatility on rainy day funds.   
Joyce’s (2001) index does provide some initial evidence that can lay a foundation 
for further empirical analysis, thus it is reconstituted here with recent data from 2010.  
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Given Joyce's own description of the index, it is merely used as a first step in the analysis 
to be undertaken in this essay.  The factors in the index include the percentage of general 
revenue from the corporate income tax,20 the absolute deviation of a state’s 
unemployment rate as compared to the national average, the percentage of general 
revenue from the federal government, the percentage of general revenue from gambling 
sources, and the percentage of total expenditures on Medicaid.  Volatility scores are 
assigned with the highest value in any category receiving a five.  The other state scores 
are calculated based on their deviation from the highest score.  The results from each 
category along with their volatility scores are shown in Tables A.2-A.3 in Appendix A.  
The total volatility scores and their ranks along with rainy day fund sizes (measured as a 
percentage of general expenditures and their ranks, as well as rank differences, are in 
Table 2.1 below.  Ranks are assigned such that the most volatile state is ranked 50th, 
while the states with the greatest rainy day fund balance are also ranked 50th.  The most 
volatile state in 2010, based on this index was Nevada, which incidentally also tied for 
the lowest rainy day fund balance at zero.  In fact, 16 other states also had balances of 
zero.  Rank difference is merely the rainy day fund balance rank minus the volatility 
rank.  The state with the greatest negative rank difference was Connecticut at -48, while 
the state with the greatest positive rank difference was North Dakota at +41.   
 
 
 
 
20 This measure is included because it is cited as the “most unstable” among the largest state government 
revenue sources (Holcombe & Sobel, 1997). 
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Table 2.1: State Comparison of Volatility Scores and Rainy Day Funds 
  
Total Volatility 
Score Rank 
Rainy Day Fund as 
% of Expenditures Rank 
Rank 
Difference 
Alabama 6.58 8 0.00% 1 -7 
Alaska 8.22 28 106.49% 50 22 
Arizona 8.39 30 0.00% 1 -29 
Arkansas 7.31 15 0.00% 1 -14 
California 9.80 42 0.00% 1 -41 
Colorado 7.44 19 0.61% 26 7 
Connecticut 12.46 49 0.00% 1 -48 
Delaware 8.70 33 2.69% 44 11 
Florida 9.00 37 0.40% 23 -14 
Georgia 8.75 34 0.32% 21 -13 
Hawaii 4.32 1 0.65% 27 26 
Idaho 9.12 38 0.44% 24 -14 
Illinois 8.18 27 0.00% 1 -26 
Indiana 8.17 26 0.00% 1 -25 
Iowa 6.75 11 2.59% 42 31 
Kansas 6.22 5 0.00% 1 -4 
Kentucky 6.61 9 0.00% 1 -8 
Louisiana 10.18 43 2.18% 41 -2 
Maine 7.31 16 0.00% 1 -15 
Maryland 8.69 32 1.91% 39 7 
Massachusetts 12.24 48 1.60% 35 -13 
Michigan 7.49 20 0.00% 18 -2 
Minnesota 8.28 29 0.00% 1 -28 
Mississippi 9.44 39 1.47% 33 -6 
Missouri 7.36 17 1.01% 30 13 
Montana 8.17 25 0.00% 1 -24 
Nebraska 6.68 10 5.30% 46 36 
Nevada 14.45 50 0.00% 1 -49 
New Hampshire 10.89 45 0.14% 19 -26 
New Jersey 9.47 40 0.00% 1 -39 
New Mexico 8.61 31 1.75% 37 6 
New York 7.86 23 0.87% 29 6 
North Carolina 7.91 24 0.35% 22 -2 
North Dakota 6.24 6 6.93% 47 41 
Ohio 7.10 13 0.00% 1 -12 
Oklahoma 6.36 7 1.94% 40 33 
Oregon 7.37 18 1.05% 31 13 
Pennsylvania 9.57 41 0.00% 17 -24 
Rhode Island 12.13 47 1.76% 38 -9 
South Carolina 5.64 2 0.49% 25 23 
South Dakota 8.92 36 2.68% 43 7 
Tennessee 10.46 44 1.72% 36 -8 
Texas 8.90 35 7.51% 48 13 
Utah 5.78 3 1.48% 34 31 
Vermont 6.88 12 1.10% 32 20 
Virginia 7.15 14 0.77% 28 14 
Washington 7.61 21 0.26% 20 -1 
West Virginia 11.02 46 5.16% 45 -1 
Wisconsin 5.97 4 0.00% 1 -3 
Wyoming 7.63 22 8.03% 49 27 
 
26 
 
When examining these results for any connection between volatility and rainy day funds, 
there is not much evidence to support either of the two hypotheses.  Figure 2.6 is a scatter 
plot of rainy day fund balances as a percentage of general expenditures and the total 
volatility index, both in 2010.   
 
Figure 2.6: Scatter Plot of Rainy Day Fund Balances and Total Volatility Score, 
2010 
 
Note: Alaska is an outlier and is not included in the plot.  Alaska's volatility score was 8.22 and rainy day 
fund balances were 106.48%. 
 
The graph reveals that as volatility increases there is no strong corresponding increase in 
rainy day fund balances.  If the states were saving in their rainy day funds based on their 
volatility scores, then an upward linear trend would be expected.  The outlier in the data 
is Alaska, which has inordinately high rainy day fund balances due to its funding from 
natural resources.  The correlation between the total volatility score and rainy day fund 
balances is -0.02, while the correlation between ranks is 0.05, both of which indicate no 
significant relationship between volatility and rainy day fund size.  It would be expected 
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that these correlations would be higher if states saved in their rainy day funds based on 
their volatility levels as measured by the index.   
Another statistical approach used to gauge the balances in rainy day funds with 
the budgetary environment is developed here.  Hou (2005, 2006) examined the 
expenditure side of the budget and the effects of reserves such as rainy day funds on 
expenditures and public service provision, particularly during economic downturns.  This 
analysis focuses on the revenue side of the budget and rainy day fund balances from 2000 
to 2010.  First, total own source tax revenues for each state from 2000 to 2010 are 
regressed on the years in a time trend forecast, and then the estimated values are 
compared to actual observed values in each year for each state.  The time period is 
selected for analysis based on the findings of Seegert (2012) and Boyd and Dayaden 
(2009) of increased revenue volatility in the 2000s.  If states responded to changes in tax 
revenue volatility with policies designed to mitigate the effects of such volatility, then 
increasing rainy day fund balances would be a policy approach with some merit.  This 
time trend forecast approach used here can be modeled as follows: 
(1) Actualtaxrevenuei,t= α0 + α1Year 
where Actualtaxrevenue is the actual tax revenue for state i in year t as reported by the 
Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of State Government Finance, α0 is the constant term, 
and α1Year is the time component, where the years are converted to an integral sequence, 
thus 2000 is a one and so on.  The forecast results for each state are reported in Table A.4 
in Appendix A.  Any differences between the estimated forecast values and the actual 
values (taken as actual minus estimated figures) provide us with residuals, which are then 
taken as a percentage of general expenditures to place them in context with state budget 
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size.  A number of useful measures can be calculated based on the forecasts and residuals 
from the trend line.  Table 2.2 displays a number of metrics derived from the regression 
results.  The values are all taken as a percentage of general expenditures.  The average 
deviation is the average of all the years differences and includes both positive and 
negative differences, while an average of only negative year deviations is also shown.  A 
range of the deviations can be seen with the maximum and minimum deviations over the 
time period, although for rainy day fund policy the lowest negative bound is the most 
pertinent.  Finally, the number of years each state had a negative deviation are shown, 
along with average rainy day fund balances as a percentage of general expenditures over 
the period in question.  The average minimum deviation for all the states was slightly less 
than five percent with an average negative deviation for all states of just over three 
percent.  Alaska had the greatest average maximum and minimum deviations of all states.  
Outside of Alaska, the greatest minimum deviation was seen by Wyoming, at just over 
nine percent.  The average maximum deviation was nearly six percent.  Finally, the 
average number of years with a negative deviation in the sample was slightly less than six 
years.  Despite this, the average rainy day fund balance during the time period was 2.34 
percent of expenditures.   
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Table 2.2: Actual versus Estimated Total Tax Revenue Values, Time Trend Forecast 
  
Average 
Deviation 
Average 
Negative 
Deviation 
Maximum 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Deviation 
Number of 
Negative 
Years 
Average Rainy 
Day Fund 
Balance 
Alabama 0.00% -2.54% 3.41% -3.99% 5 0.88% 
Alaska -0.33% -9.67% 45.49% -15.95% 8 43.87% 
Arizona -0.33% -4.36% 11.12% -9.65% 7 1.03% 
Arkansas -0.01% -3.19% 3.52% -4.42% 6 0.00% 
California 0.00% -4.99% 5.88% -6.35% 5 1.14% 
Colorado 0.00% -3.00% 4.84% -5.65% 6 0.77% 
Connecticut 0.12% -4.67% 7.26% -6.12% 5 3.14% 
Delaware -0.12% -2.25% 4.03% -5.03% 6 2.60% 
Florida -0.37% -4.88% 11.17% -8.24% 6 1.60% 
Georgia -0.10% -2.88% 5.69% -6.44% 6 1.61% 
Hawaii -0.06% -3.68% 5.75% -4.29% 5 0.49% 
Idaho -0.07% -4.62% 7.15% -6.76% 5 0.94% 
Illinois 0.03% -3.96% 5.84% -5.16% 5 0.38% 
Indiana -0.02% -2.69% 3.27% -4.86% 5 1.31% 
Iowa -0.02% -2.26% 4.38% -4.15% 5 2.37% 
Kansas -0.05% -2.61% 4.58% -3.91% 6 0.00% 
Kentucky -0.01% -1.24% 2.66% -2.69% 7 0.54% 
Louisiana -0.15% -2.94% 5.99% -6.42% 7 1.68% 
Maine -0.02% -2.81% 4.18% -3.79% 6 0.97% 
Maryland -0.02% -2.36% 3.13% -4.22% 5 2.56% 
Massachusetts -0.12% -3.16% 5.21% -5.88% 6 3.94% 
Michigan 0.01% -1.34% 2.96% -2.55% 6 0.51% 
Minnesota 0.01% -2.70% 4.09% -3.69% 5 2.97% 
Mississippi -0.05% -1.84% 2.78% -2.61% 6 0.98% 
Missouri 0.00% -2.14% 3.20% -3.57% 6 0.97% 
Montana -0.01% -4.05% 4.17% -5.27% 5 0.00% 
Nebraska 0.00% -2.24% 3.32% -4.95% 6 3.56% 
Nevada -0.31% -4.72% 8.60% -6.64% 7 1.24% 
New Hampshire -0.02% -1.63% 1.82% -1.89% 4 0.62% 
New Jersey -0.10% -4.65% 7.61% -7.59% 5 0.74% 
New Mexico -0.07% -3.47% 5.98% -5.24% 5 2.58% 
New York 0.04% -2.93% 3.63% -5.09% 5 0.64% 
North Carolina -0.04% -3.22% 5.84% -4.05% 6 0.75% 
North Dakota -0.10% -5.48% 12.86% -8.45% 6 2.88% 
Ohio -0.07% -2.53% 3.69% -4.08% 6 1.03% 
Oklahoma 0.01% -3.16% 4.21% -5.79% 5 2.04% 
Oregon 0.03% -2.83% 4.68% -5.20% 6 0.37% 
Pennsylvania 0.01% -2.34% 3.44% -3.18% 5 0.86% 
Rhode Island -0.08% -2.59% 3.61% -3.59% 5 1.35% 
South Carolina -0.02% -2.42% 5.20% -3.93% 5 0.34% 
South Dakota 0.01% -1.05% 1.50% -1.42% 5 3.50% 
Tennessee 1.74% -2.00% 5.78% -2.48% 3 1.43% 
Texas -0.01% -2.90% 6.28% -3.77% 5 1.83% 
Utah -0.02% -3.37% 7.23% -5.44% 6 1.49% 
Vermont -0.10% -4.20% 5.06% -6.51% 5 1.02% 
Virginia -0.06% -3.52% 6.38% -4.86% 5 2.01% 
Washington 0.00% -2.78% 5.31% -4.31% 7 0.62% 
West Virginia 0.01% -2.24% 2.63% -3.14% 6 2.48% 
Wisconsin 0.03% -1.70% 4.33% -2.32% 7 0.00% 
Wyoming -0.07% -4.75% 7.19% -9.23% 5 6.30% 
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Figure 2.7 is a scatter plot of the absolute value of each state’s average negative 
deviations over the time period, as a percentage of average general expenditures, derived 
from the time trend forecast and their average rainy day fund balance as a percentage of 
general expenditures from 2000 to 2010.   
 
Figure 2.7: Scatter Plot of Average Negative Deviations from Time Trend Forecast 
and Rainy Day Fund Balances 
 
Note: Alaska is an outlier and is not included in the plot.  Alaska's average negative deviation was -9.67% 
and its average rainy day fund balance was 43.87%. 
 
As the negative differences grow, there is some corresponding growth in average rainy 
day fund balances, but the evidence is not particularly strong.  Correlations of each year’s 
differences as a percentage of expenditures and rainy day fund balances also showed no 
significant relationship.   
 An additional forecast is utilized to further compare rainy day fund balances with 
revenue deviations.  A time trend squared forecast model is estimated based on the 
following specification in equation two: 
(2) Actualtaxrevenuei,t= α0 + α1Year + α2Year2 
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where Actualtaxrevenue is again the actual tax revenue for state i in year t as reported by 
the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of State Government Finance, α0 is the constant 
term, and α1Year is the time component, and α2Year2 is the year squared.  The forecast 
results for each state are reported in Table A.5 in Appendix A.  Residuals are again 
calculated as actual tax revenues minus estimated revenues and are taken as a percentage 
of general expenditures.  The same metrics displayed in Table 2.2 are shown in Table 2.3 
for the time trend squared forecast.  For the 50 states, the average minimum deviation 
from the trend squared forecasted values was five percent.  Alaska also had the greatest 
average maximum and minimum deviations for the time trend squared forecast.  Nevada 
had the second greatest average minimum deviation at slightly over nine percent.  The 
average number of years with a negative deviation was fairly close to the time trend 
model, at just under six negative years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
Table 2.3: Actual versus Estimated Total Tax Revenue Values, Time Trend Squared 
Forecast 
  
Average 
Deviation 
Average 
Negative 
Deviation 
Maximum 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Deviation 
Number of 
Negative 
Years 
Average 
Rainy Day 
Fund Balance 
Alabama 0.00% -2.15% 2.90% -4.62% 5 0.88% 
Alaska -0.27% -7.85% 45.95% -17.94% 8 43.87% 
Arizona -0.17% -5.11% 8.82% -9.02% 7 1.03% 
Arkansas 0.01% -3.31% 3.99% -5.04% 6 0.00% 
California 0.03% -4.97% 5.38% -6.91% 5 1.14% 
Colorado 0.00% -2.95% 4.86% -5.46% 6 0.77% 
Connecticut 0.12% -4.67% 7.21% -6.17% 5 3.14% 
Delaware -0.09% -2.13% 4.33% -5.87% 6 2.60% 
Florida -0.16% -2.97% 8.23% -7.51% 6 1.60% 
Georgia -0.01% -2.92% 4.65% -5.79% 6 1.61% 
Hawaii -0.04% -3.72% 4.50% -5.50% 5 0.49% 
Idaho -0.04% -4.00% 6.38% -7.59% 5 0.94% 
Illinois 0.04% -2.76% 5.78% -5.42% 5 0.38% 
Indiana -0.01% -1.81% 4.00% -3.64% 5 1.31% 
Iowa -0.01% -2.44% 2.41% -3.38% 5 2.37% 
Kansas -0.04% -2.68% 4.39% -3.60% 6 0.00% 
Kentucky 0.00% -1.21% 2.20% -2.34% 7 0.54% 
Louisiana -0.16% -3.58% 4.89% -5.37% 7 1.68% 
Maine 0.03% -2.41% 4.60% -4.58% 6 0.97% 
Maryland 0.00% -2.39% 3.51% -4.78% 5 2.56% 
Massachusetts -0.12% -3.14% 5.22% -5.86% 6 3.94% 
Michigan 0.02% -1.08% 2.88% -2.01% 6 0.51% 
Minnesota 0.02% -2.31% 3.95% -3.71% 5 2.97% 
Mississippi -0.04% -1.61% 2.76% -2.34% 6 0.98% 
Missouri 0.02% -1.67% 2.95% -3.27% 6 0.97% 
Montana -0.03% -4.18% 4.08% -4.95% 5 0.00% 
Nebraska 0.02% -1.85% 3.97% -4.55% 6 3.56% 
Nevada -0.08% -5.13% 8.67% -9.11% 7 1.24% 
New Hampshire 0.01% -0.53% 1.72% -1.08% 4 0.62% 
New Jersey 0.00% -4.00% 6.97% -5.85% 5 0.74% 
New Mexico -0.04% -3.14% 5.20% -6.33% 5 2.58% 
New York 0.02% -2.76% 3.93% -4.72% 5 0.64% 
North Carolina -0.03% -2.85% 5.43% -4.58% 6 0.75% 
North Dakota 0.00% -1.01% 5.64% -2.24% 6 2.88% 
Ohio 0.00% -1.74% 3.87% -3.49% 6 1.03% 
Oklahoma 0.05% -3.55% 3.57% -5.38% 5 2.04% 
Oregon 0.02% -2.51% 4.35% -5.24% 6 0.37% 
Pennsylvania 0.01% -2.36% 3.78% -3.65% 5 0.86% 
Rhode Island 0.01% -1.66% 2.46% -3.12% 5 1.35% 
South Carolina 0.01% -2.10% 4.55% -3.26% 5 0.34% 
South Dakota 0.01% -1.05% 1.50% -1.42% 5 3.50% 
Tennessee 0.03% -1.82% 3.67% -4.37% 3 1.43% 
Texas -0.01% -2.88% 6.28% -3.86% 5 1.83% 
Utah -0.02% -3.62% 6.56% -5.69% 6 1.49% 
Vermont -0.08% -4.24% 5.54% -7.39% 5 1.02% 
Virginia -0.04% -2.98% 5.34% -5.98% 5 2.01% 
Washington 0.01% -2.60% 4.62% -4.15% 7 0.62% 
West Virginia 0.03% -2.34% 2.75% -3.27% 6 2.48% 
Wisconsin 0.03% -1.32% 3.83% -2.18% 7 0.00% 
Wyoming -0.03% -4.37% 7.69% -8.00% 5 6.30% 
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Figure 2.8 is a scatter plot of the absolute value of each state’s average negative 
deviations, as a percentage of average general expenditures, derived from the time trend 
squared forecast model plotted against average rainy day fund balance as a percentage of 
expenditures from 2000 to 2010.  
 
Figure 2.8: Scatter Plot of Average Negative Deviations from Time Trend Squared 
and Rainy Day Fund Balances 
 
Note: Alaska is an outlier and is not included in the plot.  Alaska's average negative deviation was -17.94% 
and its average rainy day fund balance was 43.87%. 
 
The results are similar to the scatter plot from the time trend forecast, with some growth 
in fund balances as average negative tax revenue deviations increase.  However, there 
still does not appear to be a strong upward linear trend relationship that was expected.  
Overall, the time trend and time trend squared forecast approaches yield similar results 
for revenue deviations and the various statistics presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.   
 The initial evidence provided by these metrics indicated that there was not strong 
anecdotal evidence of any significant relationship between a state’s budgetary 
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environment and the size of its rainy day fund.  While these metrics are by no means an 
exhaustive list of possible ways to test the hypothesis, they provide initial evidence of 
any relationship between a state’s budgetary environment and the size of its rainy day 
fund.  To further test the hypothesis, a number of additional measures gauging the status 
of state budgetary environments will be utilized in a comprehensive regression approach 
along with several control variables.  The data and empirical approach used in this 
regression are now examined in greater detail. 
 
2.4.1 Model Specification 
 
The model is designed to analyze the impact of state rainy day fund balances on 
state tax revenues, focusing on these reserves as a response to revenue volatility, while 
controlling for budgetary, socioeconomic, and political effects.  The results should 
indicate if states that have greater tax revenue volatility (as measured by residuals from 
the forecast time trend line calculated in equation one) over the last decade are states that 
plan for and respond to volatility by maintaining higher rainy day fund balances.  A fixed 
effects model is used to control for unobserved cross-state variations.  Due to the similar 
results from the time trend and the time trend squared model, the time trend model is 
used to develop the dependent variable in the model.  The deviations from both trend 
lines as a percentage of general expenditures were highly correlated with near exact 
means, standard deviations, and ranges.  Due to the shorter time frame from 2000 to 
2010, the deviations from the time trend model are used as the dependent variable.  The 
model to be estimated is specified as follows: 
(3)  Revenue Volatilityit= β0 + β1Rainy Day Fundit + β2Bit + β3Eit + β4Pit + δi + εit 
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where Revenue Volatility is defined as state i’s deviation from the time trend forecast, 
calculated as actual revenues minus estimated trend line revenues, as a percentage of 
general expenditures in year t with β’s representing the estimated coefficients and β0 as 
the constant term.  Rainy day funds are measured in yearly stocks as a percentage of 
general expenditures.  B is a vector of budgetary and revenue variables that control for 
several elements of budget structure that could impact revenue volatility.  For the sake of 
classification, rainy day fund balances are listed under budget and revenue measures in 
Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.  E is a vector of variables controlling for socioeconomic 
conditions including a state’s economic base and population.  Political and ideological 
variables are included in vector P to control for any political impacts on fund balances.  
State i’s fixed effect is represented by δi.  Finally, ε is the idiosyncratic error term.  The 
variables in each vector are discussed in greater detail in section 2.4.2 and are displayed 
in Table 2.4. 
 
2.4.2 Data  
 
In order to continue the analysis of the relationship between rainy day fund 
balances and fiscal stress in the states, a dataset is built for use with the model specified 
previously.  A panel dataset of states is constructed for the model.  The dependent 
variable used in the model to represent revenue volatility is the difference between the 
actual and estimated time trend revenues calculated previously, taken as a percentage of 
general expenditures.  This allows revenue differences to be placed in context with the 
size of the annual budget.  Data on state tax revenue used to produce the forecast 
residuals was gathered from the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of State Government 
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Finances.   Annual state general expenditures were also gathered from the Census 
Bureau’s Annual Survey of State Government Finances.   
 The focus of the analysis is on the association of rainy day fund balances with 
revenue volatility.  It would be expected that states that had greater revenue volatility, 
particularly those that experienced actual revenues that were less than the time trend line 
forecast predicted, would maintain higher rainy day fund balances to mitigate the effects 
of negative revenue volatility.   Rainy day fund balances were gathered from the National 
Association of State Budget Officers bi-annual Fiscal Survey of the States.  Those 
balances were then converted by taking fund balances as a percentage of annual general 
expenditures, which were pulled from the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of State 
Government Finances.  Other independent variables in the model fall into one of several 
categories; budget and revenue measures, socioeconomic measures, and political and 
ideological measures.  Income taxes, both individual and corporate, are included as a 
percentage of total tax revenues.  Revenues derived from sales taxes as a percentage of 
total tax revenues are also included.  Sales, individual income, and corporate income tax 
revenues comprise over 65 percent of average state tax revenue.  Finally, measures are 
incorporated for each category to assess if a state relies on one source for over half of its 
tax revenues.  Since no state relies on corporate income taxes to such a degree it is not 
included.  States that rely heavily on one source of revenue would be less diversified, and 
subject to greater risk of increased revenue volatility if a revenue source that constitutes a 
significant portion of a state’s revenue base is more cyclical than others.   
 Several variables are included to control for a state's socioeconomic 
characteristics.   The log of per capita income controls for income differences across 
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states.  The composition of a state’s economic base may also play a role in revenue 
volatility.  The Herfindahl- Hirschman Index, or HHI, is the most common measure used 
to examine diversification and has been utilized in a number of studies (Suyderhound, 
1994; Hendrick, 2002; Carroll, 2005; Jordan & Wagner, 2008; Carroll, 2009).  The HHI 
utilizes the proportions of state GDP from various sectors as a sum of squares measure.  
Values closer to 1 are indicative of a more diversified economic base.  This will measure 
how diverse a state’s economic base is, as states that are particularly reliant on one 
industry may be more susceptible to economic downturns and thus possibly increased 
revenue volatility.  The formula used to calculate economic base diversification in this 
analysis is shown here, with economic base diversification denoted by EBD: 
0.83]/B[1EBD
6
1j
2
j∑
=
−=  
where B is the share of the state’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that is derived from 
industry j, with the industries here including manufacturing, government, real estate, 
retail trade, finance, and all others.  These were chosen as they represented the five 
largest average components of GDP across all states and together, on average, constituted 
over 50 percent of state GDP.  Each of these five industry areas is also included 
individually as a percentage of GDP, because states may have a different composition of 
industries, but still have the same level of diversification.  Manufacturing, real estate, 
retail trade, government, and finance are likely to have some level of impact on a state’s 
economy, depending on their contribution to a state’s economic base and their 
susceptibility to business cycles.  Finally, the log of state population is included to control 
for any differences that population may have on rainy day fund balances. 
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Several political variables are included in the data set to control for political, and 
ostensibly citizenry, preferences regarding budgeting, which may influence how 
policymakers deal with revenue volatility.  Control of the governor’s office by party is a 
dummy variable for a Democrat in office.  House is a dummy variable measuring control 
of the lower chamber, with Democrat-controlled chambers being assigned a one and 
Republican or split chambers a zero.  Senate is also a dummy variable indicating partisan 
control of the state’s upper legislative chamber with a Democrat-controlled chamber 
being assigned a one and Republican or split chambers being assigned a zero.  A measure 
of government ideology is included to account for any effects that partisan measures may 
not capture.  This measure is referred to as the “NOMINATE measure of state 
government ideology” which was developed by Berry, Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, and 
Klarner (2010).  Lastly, a measure of citizen ideology is included in the model to attempt 
to capture some citizenry preferences regarding rainy day funds and savings that may be 
present in ideological leanings.  The measure is referred to as the “revised 1960-2010 
citizen ideology series” which was originally constructed by Berry, Ringquist, Fording, 
and Hanson (1998) and has been updated since.  Both ideologies are measured on a scale 
from zero to 100, with more conservative ideologies being closer to zero and more liberal 
ideologies being closer to 100.   
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Table 2.4: Variables, Variable Description, and Data Source 
Variable Description Source 
Revenue Volatility 
Time Trend 
Deviations from forecast time trend line as a 
percentage of general expenditures 
Census Bureau, author 
calculations 
Budget and Revenue Measures 
Rainy Day Fund 
Balances  
Rainy day fund balances as a percentage of general 
expenditures 
NASBO, Census Bureau 
Individual Income Tax 
Revenue 
Percentage of tax revenue from individual income 
taxes 
Census Bureau  
Corporate Income Tax 
Revenue 
Percentage of tax revenue from corporate income 
taxes 
Census Bureau  
Sales Tax Revenue Percentage of tax revenue from sales taxes Census Bureau 
Individual Income Tax 
Reliance 
1= Over 50% of tax revenue derived from individual 
income taxes; 0=other 
Census Bureau, author 
calculations 
Sales Tax Reliance 1= Over 50% of tax revenue derived from sales taxes; 
0=other 
Census Bureau, author 
calculations 
Socioeconomic Measures 
Log Per Capita Income Log of state’s per capita income Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Economic Base 
Diversification 
HHI measure of economic base Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Manufacturing Percentage of state GDP derived from manufacturing Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Government Percentage of state GDP derived from government 
spending 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Real Estate Percentage of state GDP derived from real estate Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Retail Trade Percentage of state GDP derived from retail trade Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Finance Percentage of state GDP derived from finance Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Log Population Log of state population Census Bureau 
Political and Ideological Measures 
Governor 1= Democrat, 0= Republican or Independent U.S. Statistical Abstract 
House 1= Democrat control, 0= Republican or other U.S. Statistical Abstract 
Senate 1= Democrat control, 0= Republican or other U.S. Statistical Abstract 
Government Ideology NOMINATE measure of state government ideology Berry, Fording, Ringquist, 
Hanson, and Klarner (2010) 
Citizen Ideology Revised citizen ideology measure Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and 
Hanson (1998) 
 
The summary statistics for the variables are shown in Table 2.5.  The data is from 2000 to 
2010, due to the marked increase in tax revenue volatility that occurred in this time 
period as noted by Seegert (2012) and Boyd and Dayaden (2009).  States that did not 
have a rainy day fund were excluded from the data set including Arkansas, which did not 
establish a fund until 2010, as well as Kansas and Montana.  Oregon established a rainy 
day fund in 2008, and is included from that point forward.  Alabama had an education 
rainy day fund that was used exclusively for education purposes, but did establish a 
general rainy day fund in 2008, thus it is included from that point forward.  Nebraska is 
excluded due to its non-partisan unicameral legislature.  Alaska is also excluded as an 
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outlier and due to its funding structure that relies on natural resource funding for its rainy 
day fund.   
 
Table 2.5: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean  Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables 
Revenue Volatility Time Trend† -0.02 3.54 -9.65 12.86 
Budget and Revenue Measures 
Rainy Day Fund Balances  0.02 0.02 0 0.13 
Individual Income Tax Revenue 0.31 0.17 0 0.73 
Corporate Income Tax Revenue 0.05 0.04 0 0.27 
Sales Tax Revenue 0.33 0.14 0 0.63 
Individual Income Tax Reliance 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Sales Tax Reliance 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Socioeconomic Measures 
Log Per Capita Income 10.44 0.18 9.98 10.94 
Economic Base Diversification 0.90 0.04 0.72 0.96 
Manufacturing 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.37 
Government  0.13 0.03 0.09 0.24 
Real Estate 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.19 
Retail Trade 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.15 
Finance 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.39 
Log Population 15.20 1.02 13.11 17.44 
Political and Ideological Measures 
Governor 0.47 0.50 0 1 
House  0.56 0.50 0 1 
Senate 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Government Ideology 49.86 23.77 0 91.03 
Citizen Ideology 53.45 16.04 8.45 95.97 
 † Scaled by 100 
After these adjustments, the slightly unbalanced panel data set consists of 479 
observations for the analysis. 
 
2.4.3 Results 
 
 The panel data nature of the data naturally lends itself to a fixed or random effects 
regression.  A Hausman Test21 indicates that fixed effects would be an appropriate 
approach, as there is a strong correlation between the residuals and the model’s predicted 
21 The Hausman Test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients that are estimated by the random effects 
model are the same as the coefficients that are estimates by the fixed effects model.  If the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected, then random effects can be used as a more efficient estimation technique.  In this case, 
the null hypothesis is rejected and fixed effects are utilized. 
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values.  The results from the Hausman Test for the time trend model are shown in Table 
A.6 in Appendix A.  The fixed effects model controls for unobserved state differences 
across the data.  The Modified Wald Test22 for groupwise heteroskedasticity reveals the 
presence of heteroskedasticity, thus the model is estimated using robust standard errors.  
The results from the fixed effects estimation for the time trend model are shown in Table 
2.6.   
 
Table 2.6: Fixed Effects Regression Results 
  Coeff. Robust S.E.   
Budget and Revenue Measures 
Rainy Day Fund Balances  52.85 13.23 *** 
Individual Income Tax Revenue 30.72 12.76 ** 
Corporate Income Tax Revenue 74.66 19.91 *** 
Sales Tax Revenue 0.07 10.48  
Individual Income Tax Reliance 2.96 0.52 *** 
Sales Tax Reliance 0.23 0.86  
Socioeconomic Measures 
Log Per Capita Income -8.30 3.13 ** 
Economic Base Diversification 23.16 20.11  
Manufacturing 5.13 18.04  
Government  -179.77 59.55 *** 
Real Estate 92.91 38.02 ** 
Retail Trade 36.54 49.75  
Finance -42.32 23.40 * 
Log Population 6.96 10.55  
Political and Ideological Measures 
Governor -0.30 0.67  
House  0.73 0.76  
Senate -0.69 0.65  
Government Ideology 0.01 0.03  
Citizen Ideology 0.09 0.02 *** 
N=479    
R-squared= 0.43   
F(19, 415)= 16.18***    
*Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
 
 The fixed effects results indicate that rainy day fund balances have a statistically 
significant relationship with revenue volatility.  A one percent increase in rainy day fund 
balances corresponds to an increase of 0.5 percent in revenue deviation, which is a 
22 The Modified Wald Test tests the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity or constant variance.  The test 
results here reject the null and thus robust standard errors are employed. 
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positive deviation where actual revenues are greater than those estimated by the forecast 
trend line.23  This result indicates that states that have positive residuals, that is those that 
realize tax revenues that are greater than the forecast trend line would indicate, have 
higher rainy day fund balances.  Such states may be better positioned to pad reserve funds 
due to excess revenues, particularly if budgets are enacted based on this type of forecast.   
However, states that have more negative residuals would be more likely to benefit from 
increasing and keeping greater rainy day fund balances, yet the fiscal stress that results 
from budget shortfalls may lead to rainy day funds not receiving budget allocations or 
being tapped to fill shortfalls, hence the regression result.  Both individual income and 
corporate income taxes exert a positive effect on revenue deviations, which may indicate 
that these taxes have a more positive cyclical effect.  Similarly, reliance on individual 
income taxes for over 50 percent of tax revenues also has a positive impact.  Several 
socioeconomic measures are statistically significant.  The log of per capita income has a 
negative effect on revenue deviations.  The percentage of state GDP derived from 
government and finance both have a negative effect on revenue deviation, with a one 
percent increase in government GDP having a negative effect on revenue deviation of 1.8 
percent and a one percent increase in finance GDP having a negative effect of 0.4 
percent.  Conversely, real estate GDP has a positive effect on revenue deviations during 
the 2000s.  This could be a result of the rapid increase in real estate that occurred during 
the time period offsetting the decline in real estate that occurred during the last few years 
of the 2000s.  The only political or ideological variable that is statistically significant is 
23 A more traditional approach from the literature was also tested.  In this approach, rainy day funds were 
used as a dependent variable, with revenue volatility as an independent variable in the same fixed effects 
regression approach.  The results are not shown here, but they indicated the same impact, with positive 
revenue volatility resulting in greater rainy day fund balances. 
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citizen ideology.  The results show that states with more conservative citizens have an 
increase in positive revenue deviations. 
 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
 Accounting for fiscal stress in the budgeting process and preparing accordingly, is 
the hallmark of rainy day funds as a fiscal institution.  Evidence from the literature 
indicates that these funds have been effective at reducing fiscal stress if they are 
structured properly.  Continuing to examine rainy day funds and the relationship between 
fiscal stress, particularly revenue volatility, and fund balances provides new evidence on 
an unexplored aspect of these funds.  On the whole, the results from the various methods 
used here do not provide strong evidence when addressing the issue of whether states 
utilize their rainy day funds in proportion to the level of fiscal stress.  The index of 
volatility showed no link between volatility and rainy day fund balances in most states.  
The comparison of estimated revenues with actual revenues to measure revenue volatility 
also appeared to show no relationship to rainy day fund size.  Utilizing the residuals from 
the forecast trend line as a dependent variable in a regression showed that rainy day fund 
balances were positively associated with positive revenue deviations.  This evidence 
indicates that states that realize greater revenue collections than may be forecasted 
maintain greater reserves.   
 As a policy tool, however, states that have negative revenue deviations are more 
likely to need rainy day funds.  It is also possible that these states had rainy day fund 
balances, but were forced to utilize funds to cover revenue shortfalls.  Still, the results 
would indicate that policy changes to management of rainy day funds may prove 
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beneficial to states with more volatile tax revenue streams.  By making fiscal reserves, 
such as rainy day funds a priority, states that experience revenue volatility, particularly 
negative revenue volatility, will be better prepared to smooth expenditures and budget 
processes.  
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CHAPTER 3 
E-commerce Taxation: Analyzing Streamlined Sales and Use 
Tax Agreement Adoption by the States 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 Since the institution of state sales taxes there have often been issues regarding 
application and collection of such taxes on the sale of goods across state borders.  This 
problem first arose as a result of mail order sales and as a remedy, states adopted use 
taxes24 as a sales tax complement (Due & Mikesell, 1983).  The growth in online internet 
sales, commonly referred to as e-commerce,25 has exacerbated the problem of how to tax 
sales across borders.  Online sales have experienced marked growth with U.S. Census 
Bureau statistics showing that retail sales classified as e-commerce totaled nearly $167 
billion in 2010, a five-fold increase from 2000.  If a business selling goods or services 
over the internet has no presence, or nexus, in a government’s jurisdiction, then the 
government cannot compel that business to collect and remit sales or use taxes on 
purchases made by consumers living in that jurisdiction due to the Supreme Court rulings 
in National Bellas Hess v. the Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois (386 U.S. 
753, 87 [S. Ct. 1967]) and Quill Corporation v. North Dakota (504 U.S. 298, 112 [S. Ct. 
1992]).  These rulings allow consumers to avoid paying taxes when goods are purchased.  
This has created a dilemma for states whose budgets rely on sales and use taxes.  
Estimates of annual revenue losses from online sales, including business to business sales 
24 The concept of a use tax is that any product that is purchased in another jurisdiction but utilized or stored 
in a consumer’s home jurisdiction, is subject to a use tax on the purchase price, which must be paid to the 
home jurisdiction.   
25 E-commerce can be generally thought of as the sale of goods or services where the order is placed or 
negotiated over the internet.   
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and business to consumers sales, were estimated at $2.7 billion in 2000 (Bruce & Fox, 
2000) and have grown to $11.4 billion in 2012 (Bruce, Fox, & Luna, 2009).   
In response to the growing problem of lost revenues from online sales as well as 
the complexity inherent in enforcing varying combinations of state and local tax rates 
across multiple jurisdictions, there has been a joint effort by states to streamline the 
process of administering and collecting sales and use taxes through the Streamlined Sales 
and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA).26  By simplifying tax structures the goal is to make 
compliance easier for online vendors, thereby encouraging them to collect and remit 
applicable taxes.  Many states also offer amnesty for previously uncollected taxes in 
order to entice businesses to register and collect applicable taxes from consumers.  To 
date, twenty-four states have joined, or adopted the agreement by passing legislation that 
complies with the tenets of the agreement.   
 
3.1.1 Research Question 
 
 This essay examines the growth in e-commerce and the associated difficulties that 
face states due to uncollected sales and use taxes.  The growth in e-commerce and the 
loss of tax revenues can negatively impact states’ financial stability.  As internet access 
continues its rapid proliferation, it is likely that growing numbers of consumers will 
purchase goods online.  The adoption of the SSUTA Agreement by many states is the 
most significant and comprehensive attempt to remedy the issues related to taxing online 
sales.  The research question then arises: what prompted states to adopt the Streamlined 
Sales and Use Tax Agreement at its inception and what prompted states to adopt or not 
26 The agreement would set up “uniform tax definitions; uniform and simpler exemption administration; 
rate simplification; state level administration of all sales taxes, uniform sourcing; and state funding of the 
administrative cost.”  For a detailed history of the SSUTA see Swain and Hellerstein (2005). 
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adopt in later years?  The question will be tested empirically utilizing a number of 
political and economic factors in a hazard model. 
 
3.1.2 Essay Organization 
 
 The SSUTA is examined in depth throughout the essay, along with some 
proposed solutions to the problem of e-commerce.  Section two highlights the reasons 
that online sales remain exempt from sales tax collection as well as providing an 
overview of sales and use tax structures and how the traditional model of tax collection 
breaks down when online sellers do not have a physical presence in a state.  Section three 
contains a literature review and although most of the literature is theoretical, there are a 
number of solutions that have been put forth to remedy the issue of online sales taxation.  
Some guidance on policy adoptions is also provided by the  policy diffusion literature.  
The fourth section contains the empirical approach including the data, model, and results, 
while the final section summarizes the findings and the possible policy implications.   
 
3.2 Sales and Use Taxes and the Problem with E-commerce 
 
When sales taxes were first adopted in large numbers by the states27 during the 
Great Depression (Fox, 2003) there was a concern that due to differing rates, states with 
low rates or no sales tax at all would become tax havens.  This could lead to cross border 
shopping by consumers, thus shrinking the tax base and harming local businesses.  In 
order to enforce such taxes, states desired to require the businesses that made the sales 
across a border to collect and remit sales taxes.  This issue became more complicated 
with the growth of mail order sales, which led to an increase in such “cross border sales.”  
27 Today 45 states have sales taxes; those with no state sales tax are: Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New 
Hampshire, and Oregon. 
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 The Supreme Court weighed in on the issue in the Bellas Hess case in 1967.  The 
case concerned a Missouri-based business that was selling goods to Illinois residents, yet 
had no presence in Illinois, either via property, advertisement, or employees.  The state of 
Illinois attempted to compel the business to collect sales taxes from customers that lived 
in Illinois.  The court ruled that states could not require businesses to collect sales or use 
taxes from a consumer if the business did not have a nexus, or physical “brick and 
mortar” presence, within that particular state.  The court came to this ruling by noting that 
the Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution did not permit states to 
mandate that businesses collect these taxes if their only presence in the states was through 
the mail system.  Snavely (1990) notes that changing economic conditions and the 
increase in proliferation of direct mail order companies led some to believe that the ruling 
reached in the case was flawed.  Use taxes were still levied on these purchases, but the 
responsibility of paying the tax fell to the individual consumer and very low compliance 
rates resulted.  Despite the fact that not complying with such taxes represents tax evasion, 
which is an illegal act undertaken to reduce an individual’s tax liability, the inability of 
governments to track purchases that are subject to the use tax yields low compliance rates 
among consumers.   
The issue was revisited by the Supreme Court in the Quill case in 1992.  The 
Quill Corporation was an office supply retailer that had no physical presence in North 
Dakota, but its customers used a software program to place orders.  North Dakota 
attempted to force Quill to collect use taxes on goods shipped to the state.  Although the 
court issued a similar ruling, it did distinguish a difference between the Due Process and 
Commerce Clauses. The court ruled that Quill Corporation had fulfilled the Due Process 
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Clause through its fairly extensive economic activity in the state, or “minimum contacts”, 
but this did not meet the standards of “substantial nexus” that the Commerce Clause 
required.  If states were to be permitted to collect sales and use taxes from online 
vendors, Congress would have to act to mandate such collections due to its powers under 
the Commerce Clause (Hellerstein, 2000b).  These initial rulings set the stage for the 
current battle over e-commerce and its impact on state tax bases and revenue streams.   
The problems that arose from these court cases can be simply illustrated using a 
traditional sales tax collection model and the effect that online sales have on this model.  
Traditionally, governments levy sales taxes on the purchases of goods and require 
retailers located within their jurisdiction to collect and remit the tax.  In this case, tax 
collection is straight-forward.  This traditional model of brick and mortar retailers is 
shown in Figure 3.1.   
 
Figure 3.1: Traditional Sales Tax Collection Model 
 
 
Consumer: 
buys good or service
and pays sales tax on 
purchase price
Retailer: 
collects sales taxes at 
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Government: 
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in its jurisdiction
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The government requires retailers to collect and remit applicable sales taxes on goods 
sold to consumers.  In this model, there is no burden on the consumer to self-report and 
pay use taxes on purchases. 
When dealing with an online retailer however, state governments cannot compel 
the collection of sales taxes if the retailer does not have a nexus in its jurisdiction.  The 
traditional model of sales tax collection breaks down as the government has no 
mechanism to force compliance and the retailer has no incentive to comply.  Figure 3.2 
illustrates what should happen when online purchases are made, yet the model fails 
because the government has no knowledge of the purchases of the consumer, nor any 
enforcement mechanism to compel compliance, while the consumer has no incentive to 
report and pay applicable use taxes.   
 
Figure 3.2: Online Use Tax Collection Model 
 
The government wants the retailers to collect taxes on sales made to consumers living in 
their jurisdiction, while the retailer wants to take advantage of potential gains in sales it 
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could realize by offering, in essence, tax free online shopping.  Thus, the divergent goals 
of the government and the retailer provide no incentive to solve the problem.  
Furthermore, consumers have virtually no incentive to self-report purchases and pay use 
taxes after the transaction.  The end result is that many online transactions go untaxed and 
states lose revenue. 
Many states rely on sales and use taxes as a significant portion of their tax bases 
and the loss of revenue from online sales can impact budgets and service provision.  
Figure 3.3 shows the sources of state tax revenues in 2010, as reported in the Census 
Bureau’s Annual Survey of State Government Finances.  General sales taxes are the 
second largest component at nearly 32 percent, while selective sales taxes constitute 
another 17 percent.  
  
Figure 3.3: State Tax Revenue Sources, 2010 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of State Government Finances 2010 
 
Property Tax, 2%
Sales Tax, 32%
Selective Sales 
Tax, 17%
Licenses, 7%
Individual Income 
Tax, 34%
Corporate Income 
Tax, 5%
Other, 3%
52 
 
Taken together, these taxes constitute the largest source of revenue for states.  Problems 
with sales and use taxes could also impact local governments and their ability to issue 
debt that is backed by local option sales and use taxes (Cornia et al., 2001).  Certainly, 
the extent to which a state relies on sales and use taxes for revenue can affect a state’s 
desire to find ways to collect lost tax revenue.  Given the growth in online sales, there is 
the potential that sales and use taxes could constitute an even larger portion of state tax 
revenues if receipts from all online sales were collected.  Sales taxes can also be vital to 
states that do not have an income tax, thus the importance of sales taxes to state finances 
cannot be understated (Mikesell, 1992).  Individual state reliance on the sales tax is 
shown in Table 3.1, which lists state sales tax rates and the percentage of tax revenue that 
were derived from sales taxes in 2010. 
E-commerce has experienced dramatic growth over the past decade with the 
increase in internet access, online retailers, and even traditional brick and mortar stores 
entering online markets.  According to the U.S. Census Bureau, retail sales classified as 
e-commerce grew almost 400 percent from 2000 to 2010, with total sales going from $34 
billion to over $167 billion.  As a percentage of total retail sales, e-commerce has grown 
from less than one percent in 2000, to over four percent in 2010.  Manufacturing 
shipments classified as e-commerce totaled over $2 trillion in 2010, which represented 
nearly half of all manufacturing shipments.  This also indicates a dramatic increase in e-
commerce, as e-commerce manufacturing shipments in 2000 accounted for less than 20 
percent of all manufacturing shipments. 
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Table 3.1: State Sales Tax Rates and Percentage of Tax Revenues Derived from 
Sales Taxes in 2010 
  
Sales Tax Rate Sales Tax Revenue as a Percentage of 
Tax Revenue 
.Alabama 4 26 
.Alaska No State Sales Tax - 
.Arizona 6.6 43 
.Arkansas 6 36 
.California 8.25 30 
.Colorado 2.9 24 
.Connecticut 6 26 
.Delaware No State Sales Tax - 
.Florida 6 59 
.Georgia 4 33 
.Hawaii 4 48 
.Idaho 6 38 
.Illinois 6.25 32 
.Indiana 7 43 
.Iowa 6 31 
.Kansas 6.3 33 
.Kentucky 6 29 
.Louisiana 4 29 
.Maine 5 28 
.Maryland 6 25 
.Massachusetts 6.25 23 
.Michigan 6 41 
.Minnesota 6.875 26 
.Mississippi 7 45 
.Missouri 4.225 30 
.Montana No State Sales Tax - 
.Nebraska 5.5 34 
.Nevada 6.5 44 
.New Hampshire No State Sales Tax - 
.New Jersey 7 30 
.New Mexico 5.125 39 
.New York 4 17 
.North Carolina 5.75 27 
.North Dakota 5 23 
.Ohio 5.5 31 
.Oklahoma 4.5 28 
.Oregon No State Sales Tax - 
.Pennsylvania 6 27 
.Rhode Island 7 31 
.South Carolina 6 39 
.South Dakota 4 57 
.Tennessee 7 58 
.Texas 6.25 50 
.Utah 5.95 32 
.Vermont 6 12 
.Virginia 5 22 
.Washington 6.5 60 
.West Virginia 6 24 
.Wisconsin 5 27 
.Wyoming 4 37 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of State Government Finances 2010, Tax Foundation 
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The Census Bureau’s figures on total retail sales classified as e-commerce and those sales 
as a percentage of total retail sales are shown in Figure 3.4, with the upward trend 
possibly being indicative of continued future growth.  
 
Figure 3.4: E-Commerce Retail Sales, 2000-2010 
 
Source: Census Bureau’s Monthly and Annual Retail Trade Report, Various Years 
As the retail world and consumers have embraced online sales, some of the same 
issues that vexed governments in connection with mail order sales have emerged again, 
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tax system as imposed on brick and mortar businesses, but not their online competitors, 
lacks horizontal equity as governments are unable to effectively tax e-commerce, thereby 
providing online retailers a competitive advantage.  In this environment, finding a 
solution to the problem of lost tax revenues is important not only for reasons of equity, 
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represents an attempt to provide such stability and reduce fiscal stress from tightening 
budgets by increasing revenue collections. 
 
3.3 Literature Review 
 
 
3.3.1 E-Commerce 
 
Much of the work on e-commerce taxation has been theoretical or legally based 
(i.e. Zodrow, 2000; Fox & Murray, 1997; Hellerstein, 1997, 1998, 2000a; Houghton & 
Hellerstein, 2000; McLure, 1997; Murray, 1997; Bruce, Fox, & Murray, 2003; Zodrow, 
2006).  Still, several analyses have found that sales tax rates can exert an impact on the 
probability of consumers purchasing goods online (Goolsbee, 2000; Alm & Melnik, 
2005; Ballard & Lee, 2007).   This is indicative of some level of elasticity regarding the 
impact of taxes on the relative prices of goods and was cited as a reason to temporarily 
lower tax rates for e-commerce (Goolsbee & Zittrain, 1999).  Such initial lower rates 
could be justifiable since it has been found that consumers purchasing goods online have 
a relatively high price elasticity of demand (Goolsbee, 2000).  “The argument is that high 
taxes on electronic commerce will tend to significantly distort the behavior of individuals 
who are Internet shoppers and, thus, will have a high efficiency cost, relative to taxation 
of sales from traditional retailers, where the price elasticity of demand is presumably 
lower” (Zodrow, 2006, p. 10).  Still, equity concerns arise, as the types of individuals 
shopping online were likely to be wealthier (Bruce, Fox, & Murray, 2003).  Furthermore, 
uneven tax rates would put brick and mortar stores at a disadvantage (Goolsbee & 
Zittrain, 1999).  Two other scenarios are cited where favorable tax treatment of e-
commerce may have been preferable.  One occurs when compliance costs are overly 
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burdensome for online retailers (Goolsbee & Zittrain, 1999), while the other argument is 
that uniform commodity taxes are not always optimal (Zodrow, 2006).  In either of these 
cases, the theoretical argument can be made in favor of preferential tax treatment of e-
commerce (Auerbach & Hines, 2002), but even if e-commerce is awarded preferential tax 
treatment, it is still unlikely to be an optimal result (Zodrow, 2006; Bruce, Fox, & 
Murray, 2003).  Overall, the evidence does not support any variations on tax treatment 
for online sellers (Zodrow, 2000; Bruce, Fox, & Murray, 2003) and finding an optimal 
tax policy to deal with e-commerce is a difficult proposition (Murray, 1997).   
It is fairly obvious that the current system of sales and use taxation for e-
commerce has a multitude of problems and is in need of reform (Varian, 2000; McLure, 
2002).  Various proposals have been offered to address the problem of taxing online 
sales, from maintaining the status quo to eliminating internet taxes to Congressional 
action to fix the nexus problem (Varian, 2000).   When mail order sales were a concern 
for states, there were several interstate compacts used for joint enforcement of sales and 
use taxes, but federal legislation was seen as the only way to truly solve the problem 
(Snavely, 1990).  The compacts utilized in this context included information sharing 
between states when audits were conducted, and informing businesses that they could 
register with states in order to comply with use taxes.  Costs and benefit analyses of 
taxing e-commerce can also play a role in determining tax policy for online sales 
(Goolsbee & Zittrain, 1999).  In this framework, various costs such as compliance costs, 
enforcement costs, and externalities28 must be considered when determining e-commerce 
tax policy.   
28 See Zodrow (2000) p.5-7 for a discussion of network externalities. 
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Many of the proposals for reform that are detailed here are similar to the SSUTA, 
and may have laid the groundwork for the basic tenets of the agreement.  Mikesell (2000) 
proposed that Congress require registration of large online sellers for states that had easy 
compliance requirements, which were defined as no local use taxes and compensation for 
online sellers’ collection burden.  Generally, large online sellers have been found to be 
more willing to collect taxes than smaller sellers (Alm & Melnik, 2010).  Fox and Murray 
(1997) argue for destination-based taxes, which would also have to be enacted by 
Congress.  Such a system would tax final sales based on the destination, or place of 
consumption, of the goods sold.  McLure (1997) detailed a proposal that would tax all 
sales to consumers, including services, exempt sales to businesses, and perhaps most 
importantly, sellers located out of state would be subject to the same tax rates and laws as 
local businesses.  Hellerstein (1997) recommends utilizing uniform legislation, rather 
than existing state tax structures, as well as negotiations with industries that do business 
online, in order to obtain a favorable outcome.  Despite the estimated revenue losses from 
online sales, there is evidence that the internet is an engine of economic growth (Cline 
and Neubig, 1999; Goolsbee and Zittrain, 1999).  Thus, governments must be cautious in 
their approach to internet taxation, as sufficient tax revenues and economic growth are 
both important policy goals.   
Another policy action taken by some states in recent years has been to enact 
Amazon Tax Laws, named after one of the largest online retailers Amazon.com.  These 
laws require retailers located outside the state that contract with in-state affiliates29 to 
collect the state’s sales tax.  “These laws deem an out-of-state company to be an in-state-
29 Affiliates are individuals or businesses that post links or other information about the retailer’s business 
and are located within the state.  These affiliates get a share of that retailer’s revenues for referrals. 
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company for sales tax collection purposes if the company receives commissioned 
referrals from in-state resident ‘affiliates’” (Henchman, 2011, p.1).  States that currently 
have these laws in place are New York, Rhode Island, Colorado, Arkansas, California, 
Connecticut, Illinois, and North Carolina.  There have been questions raised regarding the 
constitutionality of such laws and litigation is ongoing.  This effort has led to Amazon 
cancelling its affiliate programs in those states and in some quarters these laws are seen 
as hostile towards businesses (Henchman, 2010).  Proponents of the law in California 
argued that it would bring in $200 million a year (Henchman, 2011), but Rhode Island’s 
law has had no discernible impact on revenues (Nesi, 2009).  These laws could actually 
shift the playing field in favor of brick and mortar retailers, as online retailers would have 
to track sales tax rates across all jurisdictions in which they had affiliates (Henchman, 
2010).  Thus, it remains to be seen if Amazon taxes are a viable policy response to the 
problem of online sales taxation. 
The policy that has gained the most traction with states is the SSUTA.  Due to the 
complexities of applying varying state and local sales and use tax rates, simplification 
was seen as necessary if governments were going to try and leverage e-commerce as a 
revenue source (Swain & Hellerstein, 2005).  This joint effort by states seeks to simplify 
and streamline the process of administering and collecting sales and use taxes for online 
purchases.  Such a comprehensive tax coordination effort has been used by states 
previously with the International Fuel Tax Agreement (Denison & Facer, 2005).  A map 
of state adoptions to date is shown in Figure 3.5.  As a result, the SSUTA would lower 
compliance costs for online sellers, thereby encouraging them to collect appropriate taxes 
from consumers living in states that are party to the agreement at the point of purchase.  
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The desired outcome of the coalition of states that have joined the SSUTA is for 
Congress to pass legislation that would enable states to collect taxes, thus resolving the 
issue.   The initial emergence of the SSUTA as a viable policy can be attributed to broad 
agreement as “consensus has formed among tax authorities and taxpayers that 
administrative simplification of sales taxes is a desirable goal, and such simplification is 
the guiding principle of streamlining” (Swain & Hellerstein, 2005, p.612).   
 
Figure 3.5: Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Adoptions 
 
Source: Streamlined Sales Tax Project 
 
Despite this consensus, there were political, revenue, and technological obstacles to 
SSUTA adoption (Cornia, Sjoquist, & Walters, 2004).  As constituted, the SSUTA 
agreement would closely resemble the criteria for sales tax structures as detailed by Due 
(1957).30  Cornia, Sjoquist, and Walters (2004) argue that states are unlikely to adopt 
such extensive tax reforms.  However, if the reforms adopted significantly reduced the 
compliance burden on retailers, then it is likely that more retailers would voluntarily 
collect taxes.  Yet, without financial incentives to assist with the compliance costs, it is 
30 See p.41-42. 
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possible that many businesses will still choose not to participate (Mikesell, 2000).  The 
SSUTA relies on state administration for both state and local taxes with one consolidated 
general rate for each state and a second rate for food and drug products.  States have also 
tried to cajole retailers into joining by offering amnesty for previous sales and providing 
some of the funding needed to purchase tax administration software.  Approximately 
1,400 retailers have registered to voluntary collect taxes under the system and over $700 
million in revenue have been collected by states that have adopted the SSUTA., 
according to the SSUTA Governing Board.  In order to ensure that retailers have 
adequate information when determining what goods are taxable and the appropriate rate, 
states have provided a taxability matrix that defines what is taxable in each state.  E-
commerce can lead to a narrowing of the tax base, but exemptions on certain goods can 
also contribute to this problem, which may require states to raise rates in order to collect 
equivalent amounts of revenue (Bruce & Fox, 2000).  Table 3.2 provides Bruce, Fox, and 
Luna’s (2009) estimates of state revenue losses from e-commerce in 2012, as well as the 
year in which adopters joined the SSUTA.  In fact, erosion of the tax base was occurring 
before e-commerce even became an issue and states were thought to have sufficient time 
to address the tax base (Cline & Neubig, 1999).  It is apparent that adoption of the 
SSUTA has not completely eliminated losses, but perhaps it may have reduced them.  A 
number of states adopted the SSUTA at its inception in 2005, but the initial burst of 
adoptions has slowed, with only a few states adopting in the intervening years.   
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Table 3.2: Estimated 2012 Revenue Losses from E-Commerce and SSUTA 
Adoptions 
  Estimated 2012 Losses (millions of dollars) SSUTA Adopted 
.Alabama $170.4  
.Alaska No State Sales Tax NA 
.Arizona $369.8  
.Arkansas $113.9 2008 
.California $1,904.5  
.Colorado $172.7  
.Connecticut $63.8  
.Delaware No State Sales Tax NA 
.Florida $803.8  
.Georgia $410.3 2011 
.Hawaii $60.0  
.Idaho $46.4  
.Illinois $506.8  
.Indiana $195.3 2005 
.Iowa $88.7 2005 
.Kansas $142.9 2005 
.Kentucky $109.9 2005 
.Louisiana $395.9  
.Maine $32.1  
.Maryland $184.1  
.Massachusetts $131.3  
.Michigan $141.5 2005 
.Minnesota $235.3 2005 
.Mississippi $134.9  
.Missouri $210.7  
.Montana No State Sales Tax NA 
.Nebraska $61.3 2005 
.Nevada $168.9 2008 
.New Hampshire No State Sales Tax NA 
.New Jersey $202.5 2005 
.New Mexico $120.5  
.New York $865.5  
.North Carolina $213.8 2005 
.North Dakota $15.3 2005 
.Ohio $307.9 2005* 
.Oklahoma $140.8 2005 
.Oregon No State Sales Tax NA 
.Pennsylvania $345.9  
.Rhode Island $29.0 2007 
.South Carolina $124.5  
.South Dakota $29.8 2005 
.Tennessee $410.8 2005* 
.Texas $870.4  
.Utah $88.5 2005* 
.Vermont $25.1 2007 
.Virginia $207.0  
.Washington $281.9  
.West Virginia $50.6 2005 
.Wisconsin $142.1 2009 
.Wyoming $28.6 2008 
Notes: *Indicates state is an associate member, NA=not applicable 
Source: Bruce, Fox, and Luna (2009); Streamlined Sales and Use Tax 
62 
 
As it remains to be seen if Congressional action will lead to a solution for all states, this 
agreement and the policies it represents can be analyzed to determine the reasons behind 
state adoption of the SSUTA.   
 
3.3.2 State Policy Adoptions and Innovations 
 
 When studying state adoption of policies such as the SSUTA, the policy diffusion 
literature can offer some motivations and guidance.  Generally, policy innovations are 
new policies to the adopting government (Walker, 1969), which is the case here with the 
SSUTA.  Adoptions are explained in the literature using a variety of theories including, 
diffusion, internal determinants models (Berry & Berry, 2007), and competition (e.g. 
Bailey & Rom, 2004; Ka & Teske, 2002).  These approaches will be discussed here and 
placed in context for how they may explain SSUTA adoptions.  Karch (2007) notes that 
the diffusion literature consensus is that policy diffusions are most influenced by 
geographic proximity, which can be referred to as regional diffusion.  This can occur due 
to communication between policymakers, the overlap of media and news markets 
between regions, and a propensity for governments to look to neighbors for policy 
innovations, or imitations.  The probability of adoption by a state increases as more of its 
neighbors adopt the policy (Mintrom, 1997; Berry & Berry, 1990).  Emulation of 
neighbors may arise out of a successful policy that others seek to employ with the same 
results or as they seek easy policy answers to complex problems (Glick & Hays, 1991; 
Mooney & Lee, 1995).  In such a framework, some states are leaders in adopting 
innovative policies with other states following.  Often policies that mirror this are 
characterized by slow initial adoptions by leaders followed by a burst of adoptions if the 
policy is successful.  Laggards that have not adopted, then adopt with less frequency 
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(Mooney & Lee, 1999).  However, this tendency to follow or imitate neighbors could 
also be an isomorphism approach, which is that diffusion is based on similar 
characteristics between states such as ideology (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, & 
Peterson, 2004; Volden, 2006).  This type of diffusion may not be based on policy 
success, but occurs as policymakers merely adopt what their neighbors are doing because 
they share political, economic, or demographic similarities (Abbott & DeViney, 1992).  
Another reason behind policy diffusion is that neighbors compete with each other to find 
and adopt innovative policies such as lotteries (Berry & Berry, 1990; Berry & Baybeck, 
2005).  Such competition could also be based on a desire to deter unwanted policy 
impacts such as a loss of tax revenue. 
 Policy adoption can also be explained by internal determinant models, which 
explain adoption using state characteristics such as politics, ideology, or economic factors 
(Berry & Berry, 2007).  It is noted that these determinants are not exclusive, that is, there 
are still likely to be some diffusion effects present in adoption decisions.  States with 
larger populations and more robust economies were found to be more innovative 
(Walker, 1969), which supports organizational based findings of a similar nature (Berry, 
1994).  In that same vein, fiscal health (Allard, 2004; Lowry, 2005) and the ability to 
finance innovations that may be expensive (Daley & Garand, 2005) have also been found 
as a determinant of adoptions.  Ideological factors influence not only new policy 
adoptions, but incremental policy modifications as well (Mooney & Lee, 1995; Berry & 
Berry, 1992; Sapat, 2004).  Finally, individuals known as policy entrepreneurs can drive 
adoptions (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Mintrom, 1997), as can groups of individuals or 
advocacy coalitions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 2006).  In order to examine adoptions of 
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the SSUTA the empirical model will utilize variables representing some of these adoption 
theories.  The results should indicate if SSUTA adoptions are driven more by internal 
determinants or diffusion, and perhaps identify the likelihood of future adoptions.     
 
3.4 Empirical Analysis 
 
 The impact on financial stability facing states from continued revenue losses due 
to e-commerce seems unlikely to dissipate, absent Congressional action.  As the SSUTA 
is the most widely adopted policy to date, the reasons why states chose to adopt and the 
probability that states might adopt in future years deserves examination.  States with 
certain tax structures and fiscal characteristics are likely to be more vulnerable from 
revenue losses due to e-commerce, and thus a set of testable hypotheses is developed 
focusing on fiscal reasons that may lead to SSUTA adoption. 
H1: States that rely more on sales and use tax revenues will be more likely to adopt the 
SSUTA. 
H2: States with higher sales tax rates will be more likely to adopt the SSUT. 
H3: States that had higher estimates of revenue losses due to e-commerce will be more 
likely to adopt the SSUTA. 
H4: States that have local option sales taxes will be more likely to adopt the SSUTA. 
The results from the empirical analysis should shed some insight on whether states that 
are at a greater risk from revenue losses due to online sales adopt the SSUTA as a policy 
response to attempt to mitigate some of that risk and restore financial stability.  In this 
analysis, adoption is considered to occur when a state becomes a full or associate member 
of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement.  Indicators of adoption and controls for 
political and economic impacts will also be included.  The choice to adopt the SSUTA 
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will be analyzed empirically using a hazard model approach with maximum likelihood 
estimation, also referred to as event history analysis (Berry & Berry, 1990; Volden, 
2006).   
 
3.4.1 Model Specification 
 
 The use of a hazard model in this analysis is justified by several features inherent 
in the model.  First, time spells that are right censored can be used.  A right censored time 
spell indicates the time spell is not complete at the time of the analysis.  In this case, 
states can still adopt the SSUTA after the analysis period, thus the spell is not complete.  
Secondly, independent variables are not required to be time invariant.  Finally, due to its 
non-linearity, the distribution can be specified, and the estimation here utilizes a Weibull 
distribution due to its desirable properties.  These include its likelihood of convergence, 
the increased probability of successfully estimating unmeasured heterogeneity, monotone 
or no time dependence being represented by one parameter, and only a slight difference 
from a normal distribution.   
 The hazard model, which specifies a probability distribution of time and outcome, 
can be specified in two ways.  The first specification is noted in equation one, which is a 
hazard model where the explanatory variables, denoted by δ, provide direct effects on the 
log hazard.  The constant term is represented by α in both models one and two.  The 
hazard function, H(t), is the probability of the event in question occurring during the time 
period of analysis.  As Berry and Berry (2007) propose, models of state government 
adoption or innovation can be determined by internal determinants and diffusion.  The 
models here test the fiscally focused hypotheses while also utilizing a measure of 
diffusion using neighboring state adoptions as well as a number of internal determinants. 
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(1) log Hi(t)=α + δ1Sales Tax Ratei,t + δ2Percent of Revenue from Sales Taxi,t + 
δ3Governori,t + δ4Housei,t + δ5Senatei,t + δ6Log Populationi,t + δ7Log Per Capita 
Incomei,t + δ8Economic Indicatori,t-1 + δ9Revenue Lossesi,t-1 + δ10Neighbori,t + δ11Local 
Optioni,t 
The second specification of the hazard model is shown in equation two.  In this case, the 
coefficients of explanatory variables in the model are hazard ratios.  These are the 
exponential of the estimator and the explanatory variable exp(x'δ), which gives the 
conditional probability that the event will occur during the time interval of the analysis.   
(2)  Hi(t)=exp(α + δ1Sales Tax Ratei,t + δ2Percent of Revenue from Sales Taxi,t + 
δ3Governori,t + δ4Housei,t + δ5Senatei,t + δ6Log Populationi,t + δ7Log Per Capita 
Incomei,t + δ8Economic Indicatori,t-1 + δ9Revenue Lossesi,t-1 + δ10Neighbori,t + δ11Local 
Optioni,t )  
The variables along with a description and data source are shown in Table 3.3 below.   
 
 
3.4.2 Data 
 
A data set is constructed for empirical analysis for the years 2005 through 2011.  
The decision to adopt the SSUTA, SSUTA Adoption, is the variable of interest in this 
analysis and a value of 1 is assigned for state i after adoption in year t, while no adoption 
is assigned a value of 0.  This is the underlying “failure event” in the survival time data as 
a hazard model has no dependent variable, rather it specifies a probability distribution, 
the hazard function, of time and outcome.   
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Table 3.3: Variables, Variable Description, and Data Source 
Variable Description Source 
SSUTA Adopt 1= Adopted SSUTA, 0= No Streamlined Sales Tax 
Project 
Sales Tax Rate State sales tax rate Tax Foundation 
Percent Revenue 
from Sales Tax  
Percentage of tax revenue from sales taxes Census Bureau 
Governor 1= Democrat, 0=other Statistical Abstract 
House 1= Democrat control, 0=other Statistical Abstract 
Senate 1= Democrat control, 0=other Statistical Abstract 
Log Population Log of state population Census Bureau 
Log Per Capita 
Income 
Log of per capita state income Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
Economic Indicator Index of economic health, lagged one year Philadelphia Federal 
Reserve 
Revenue Losses Estimated e-commerce revenue losses as a 
percentage of tax revenues, lagged one year 
Bruce & Fox (2004); 
Bruce, Fox, & Luna 
(2009) 
Neighbor Percentage of bordering states that have adopted 
SSUTA 
Author calculation 
Local Option 1= State has local option sales tax, 0= none Tax Foundation 
 
The Kaplan-Meier Survivor Function and the Nelson-Aalen Cumulative Hazard Function 
based on the adoptions in the data set are shown in Table 3.4.   
 
Table 3.4: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Function and Nelson-Aalen Cumulative Hazard 
Function 
Time At Risk Adopted Kaplan-Meier 
Survivor Function 
Nelson-Aalen Cumulative 
Hazard 
2005 44 15 0.66 0.34 
2007 29 2 0.61 0.41 
2008 27 4 0.52 0.56 
2009 23 1 0.50 0.60 
2011 22 1 0.48 0.65 
 
The survivor function is merely a function of how many states “survive” without 
adopting the SSUTA for a given period of time, while the cumulative hazard function 
estimates a probability of the cumulative number of expected adoptions.  As noted in the 
functions, there were no SSUTA adoptions in 2006 or 2010, and the majority of all 
adoptions occurred at the beginning of the data set in 2005.  A graph of the Kaplan-Meier 
Survival Curve, which plots the survivor function against time, is shown in Figure 3.6   
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Figure 3.6: Kaplan-Meier Survival Curve 
 
In the data set, there are 23 states that have adopted.  Nebraska adopted the SSUTA in 
2005, but due to its nonpartisan, unicameral legislature it is excluded from the data set.   
The explanatory variables of most interest are those that test the hypotheses 
developed regarding SSUTA adoption.  Percent Sales Tax Revenue measures the 
percentage of each state’s tax revenue derived from sales and usage taxes.  It is calculated 
using data from the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of State Government Finances.  This 
variable tests H1, as states that rely heavily on revenues from sales and use taxes may be 
more likely to adopt the SSUTA in an attempt to collect lost e-commerce revenues 
because, as many have noted, sales taxes are a vital revenue source for many states.  
Sales Tax Rate denotes state i’s current sales tax rate at time t, which is gathered from the 
Tax Foundation. This will provide a test of H2, as states with higher rates may be more 
vulnerable to e-commerce induced revenue losses if consumer choice is impacted by tax 
rates (Goolsbee, 2000; Alm & Melnik, 2005; Ballard & Lee, 2007).  Estimates of revenue 
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losses from e-commerce are included as a percentage of tax revenues to test H3.  Data on 
loss estimates come from Bruce and Fox (2004) and Bruce, Fox, and Luna (2009).  This 
approach puts the loss estimates in context with total tax revenues as the magnitude of a 
$1 million loss from e-commerce would have more impact in, for example, North 
Dakota, than it would in Texas.  The variable for revenue losses is lagged one year to 
allow for the delay in adoption that may occur as policymakers assess possible revenue 
losses.  Local Option is a dummy variable for states that have a local option sales tax, 
which is defined as states that allow local governments to apply an additional sales tax on 
top of the state tax.  States with a local option are assigned a 1, while states without are 
assigned a 0.  This variable will provide a test of H4.  If a state has a local option, then the 
compliance burden and the complexity for vendors is increased, as multiple variations on 
rates will have to be calculated.  Cornia, Sjoquist, and Walters (2004) noted that if the 
compliance burden decreased, then retailers would be more likely to collect and remit 
taxes, while Swain & Hellerstein (2005) note that simplification of tax structures is 
necessary if state governments want to realize revenue collections from e-commerce.  
The impact of a local option may encourage adoption of the SSUTA, as states that have 
local options may adopt the SSUTA to ease compliance by reducing costs for online 
sellers.  However, it is important to note that some localities initially opposed the SSUTA 
due to the destination based taxing in the agreement (Swain & Hellerstein, 2005), thus 
there may have initially been a negative effect on adoption rates due for states with local 
option sales taxes.  Sales Tax Rate denotes state i’s current sales tax rate at time t.  This is 
included as state reliance on sales and use taxes may also be related to tax rates, and so 
states with higher rates may also be more dependent on sales and use tax revenue and 
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thus more prone to adopt the SSUTA.  Several economic variables are included in the 
analysis.  Economic Indicator is a variable measuring state economic health and is lagged 
one year to allow for economic effects to be fully evaluated and included in any decision 
calculus.  The values are from the State Coincident Indexes compiled by the Philadelphia 
Federal Reserve Bank.  This index includes nonfarm payroll employment, average hours 
worked in manufacturing, the unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements 
adjusted by the Consumer Price Index.  The log of per capita income, Log Per Capita 
Income, is included to control for differences in income levels across states and is 
gathered from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Log Population is included to control 
for population differences across states and is the log of each state’s population as 
estimated on July 1 of the year in question by the Census Bureau.  Income and population 
should provide evidence of Walker's (1969) proposition that richer and more populous 
states are more innovative.  Several political measures are included to control for the 
effects that politics and ideology may have on adoption (Berry & Berry, 2007; Mooney & 
Lee, 1995; Berry & Berry, 1992; Sapat, 2004).  Governor is a dummy variable for party 
control of the governor’s office with Democrats being assigned a value of one and 
Republicans being assigned a value of zero. House is a dummy variable constructed in a 
similar manner.  If the Democratic Party controls the lower house in the state government 
a value of one is assigned, while Republican-controlled chambers are assigned a zero.  
Senate is a similar dummy variable designed to capture Democratic-controlled upper 
houses.  Upper legislative chambers controlled by Democrats are assigned values of one, 
while all others a value of zero.  Finally, Neighbor measures the percentage of bordering 
states that have adopted the SSUTA.  If neighboring states are adopting the SSUTA, then 
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according to diffusion theory (Gray, 1973; Walker, 1969) a state is more likely to adopt 
the SSUTA as well. 31   
The time period covered in the analysis begins with the first SSUTA adoptions in 
2005 and runs through 2011.  States that do not have a sales tax were excluded from the 
sample as was Nebraska for reasons stipulated previously.  After these adjustments, the 
pooled cross-sectional time series data set contains 308 observations, but the hazard 
model approach will eliminate state observations for years after adoption, as the state will 
no longer be at risk of adoption.  This leaves a set of 196 state years in the model.  
Naturally, the analysis is limited due to the small number of observations, thus caution 
must be exercised when examining the results.  This constraint is natural when studying 
state level adoptions as the maximum number of observations per year is 50.  Given that 
the SSUTA is a relatively new policy to states, this further limits the data that can be used 
to analyze adoptions.  Summary statistics for the data set after the adjustments are in 
Table 3.5.   
 
Table 3.5: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
SSUTA Adopt 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Sales Tax Rate 0.57 0.01 0.03 0.08 
Percent Sales Tax Revenue 0.34 0.11 0.12 0.63 
Governor 0.48 0.50 0 1 
House 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Senate 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Log Population 15.27 0.98 13.14 17.43 
Log Per Capita Income 10.53 0.15 10.18 10.94 
Economic Indicator 152.01 19.33 102.89 231.10 
Neighbor 0.30 0.27 0 1 
Revenue Losses 0.02 0.02 0.001 0.18 
Local Option 0.70 0.46 0 1 
 
31 Berry and Berry (1990) utilize a count of bordering states that have adopted, but note they find similar 
results using a proportional approach.  Both approaches were tested here and the findings are similar, 
indicating the validity of using either measure of adopting neighbor states. 
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3.4.3 Results 
 
 The hazard model results can be reported as either hazard ratios or direct effects 
on the log hazard as noted in the section on model specification.  Time dependence 
variables were initially included but the model failed to converge when a linear time and 
a quadratic time-squared variable were included.  The results from the estimation of the 
model in equation three are presented in Table 3.6, which give the direct effects of the 
explanatory variables on the log hazard.    
 
Table 3.6: SSUTA Adoption Hazard Model Results with Direct Effects 
  Coefficient S.E.   
Sales Tax Rate 0.73 0.30 *** 
Percent Sales Tax Revenue -2.71 2.42 
 Governor -0.93 0.45 **
House -0.39 0.80 
 Senate -0.74 0.81 ***
Log Population -0.61 0.29 *** 
Log Per Capita Income -4.80 2.08 * 
Economic Indicator -0.02 0.01 ** 
Revenue Losses -0.12 0.14 
 Neighbor -0.05 -0.02 ***
Local Option 1.24 0.66 * 
N=196       
LR chi2=35.73 ***       
Note: Neighbor, Sales Tax Rate, and Revenue Losses are scaled up by 100 for ease of interpretation 
*Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
 
The results from the model in equation four are shown in Table 3.7, with the effects of 
the explanatory variables shown as hazard ratios.  Hazard ratios give the conditional 
probability that a state government will adopt the SSUTA in the given time period, if they 
have not previously adopted.  The z-scores, and thus the level of significance are the 
same regardless of whether the hazard ratios or coefficients are reported.  Hazard ratio 
interpretation is relatively straight-forward.  Ratios greater than one increase the 
probability of adopting the SSUTA, while those less than one decrease the probability of 
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adoption.  The focus here is more on signs and significance, as the more relevant policy 
implications will be analyzed using marginal effects.   
 
Table 3.7: SSUTA Adoption Hazard Model Results with Hazard Ratios 
  Hazard Ratio S.E.   
Sales Tax Rate 2.07 0.62 *** 
Percent Sales Tax Revenue 0.07 0.16 
 Governor 2.53 1.14 **
House 0.68 0.54 
 Senate 0.48 0.39 
 Log Population 0.54 0.16 ***
Log Per Capita Income 0.01 0.02 ** 
Economic Indicator 0.98 0.02 ** 
Revenue Losses 0.88 0.13 
 Neighbor 0.95 0.16 ***
Local Option 3.48 2.31 * 
N=196       
LR chi2=35.73 ***       
Note: Revenue Losses, Neighbor, and Sales Tax Rate are scaled up by 100 for ease of interpretation 
*Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
 
 The results show that states with higher sales tax rates are statistically 
significantly more likely to adopt the SSUTA, yet reliance on sales and use taxes as a 
percentage of tax revenue and estimated revenue losses as a percentage of tax revenue 
had no significant influence on adoption.  Local option sales taxes also have an impact on 
SSUTA adoption, as states with local options present numerous variations on tax rates.  
This variation leads to more complexity in tax collection for online sellers, thus adopting 
the SSUTA may be more prudent for states with local option sales taxes in order to ease 
the compliance burden.   Additional findings indicate that states with good economic 
indicators are less likely to adopt as are states with larger populations and greater per 
capita incomes.  The political variables do present some interesting results.  Democratic 
control of the governor’s office as denoted by the dummy variable for Governor increases 
the likelihood that the SSUTA would be adopted while control of the state house and 
senate have no statistically significant effects.  One final intriguing result is that states 
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with neighbors that have adopted the SSUTA are less likely to adopt themselves.  
Although diffusion is often referenced in the context of continuing adoptions, this is not 
always the case.   Such a result could also merely be a random function of the states that 
have adopted and their proximity to other states, but there are several other plausible 
explanations.  If a state adopted the SSUTA, and businesses that opposed the policy 
moved to a neighboring state and subsequently lobbied that state against adoption, then 
that neighboring state may be less likely to adopt the SSUTA.  Another possible 
explanation is that neighboring states have observed SSUTA adoptions for ease of 
implementation and overall success.  Although the SSUTA Governing Board has 
reported some level of success regarding tax collections through this policy, there may be 
underlying issues with standardizing rates and product definitions, which may outweigh 
any incremental increase in tax revenues and discourage neighboring states from 
adopting.   
In order to determine the policy impacts, marginal effects are calculated to show 
the ratio of the percentage change in the explanatory variable to the percentage change in 
time to adoption of the SSUTA.  The marginal effects are presented in Table 3.8.  The 
coefficients on ey/ex provide the elasticities of the explanatory variables.  This provides 
the effects of the explanatory variables as a conditional probability that a state will adopt 
the SSUTA at some point in the future if it has not already adopted.  The focus on 
marginal effects centers on those variables that were statistically significant in the initial 
estimation and as indicated by the marginal effects.  As sales tax rates increase by one 
percent, a state is likely to adopt the SSUTA over two percent faster than other states.  
States that have a local option are also likely to adopt the SSUTA faster than others.  A 
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one percent increase in the economic indicator decreases the likelihood of adoption by 
just under two percent.  While this effect appears rather small, assume a state has a 10 
percent increase in the economic indicator, and would then be 18 percent slower in 
adopting the SSUTA.  This indicates that states with less favorable economic situations 
would be more prone to adopt the SSUTA, perhaps as a mechanism that would be 
anticipated to increase tax revenues through higher rates of compliance.   
 
Table 3.8: SSUTA Adoption Hazard Model Marginal Effects 
  ey/ex S.E.    
Sales Tax Rate -2.29 0.93 *** 
Percent Sales Tax Revenue 0.52 0.45 
 Governor -0.24 0.11 **
House 0.13 0.27 
 Senate 0.24 0.26 
 Log Population 5.33 2.68 ***
Log Per Capita Income 28.78 11.03 ** 
Economic Indicator 1.81 0.84 ** 
Revenue Losses 0.14 0.16 
 Neighbor 0.73 0.20 ***
Local Option -0.42 0.25 * 
Note: Revenue Losses, Neighbor and Sales Tax Rate are scaled up by 100 for ease of interpretation 
*Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
 
Additionally, states with greater per capita incomes were also likely to be slow adopters, 
perhaps for the same reasons as states with strong economic indicators.  Care should be 
exercised with interpretation as these variables were log-transformed prior to the 
marginal effects calculation.  Thus, states that had a one percent increase in population 
were 0.53 percent slower to adopt.  Similarly, a one percent increase in income meant 
states were nearly three percent slower to adopt the SSUTA.  These findings indicate that 
large, wealthy states were not as likely to adopt.  Such a result is not unanticipated, 
particularly for population as California, Florida, New York, and Texas have all declined 
to adopt the SSUTA to date.  The political variables indicate some interesting 
implications.  For instance, states with a Democratic governor were 20 percent more 
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likely to adopt the SSUTA than other states, while control of the state house and senate 
does not have a significant impact.  If anything, this could indicate that governors drive 
the issue of the SSUTA, although it may also be more of a non-partisan issue with 
individual state effects playing a deciding role in adoption.  Another explanation lies in 
the higher number of early adoptions which indicate that out of 15 states that adopted the 
SSUTA in 2005, eight had a Democratic governor in office at the time of adoption. 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
The growth of e-commerce is likely to continue, so finding solutions that satisfy 
both state  and local governments and online retailers is paramount to resolving the 
dispute over taxing online sales.  Other policies, such as “Amazon” tax laws, have 
emerged as potential solutions but still face numerous legal hurdles.  Regardless of the 
methods states use to try and tax internet sales, there may be no overarching solution 
without Congressional action.  Given prior Congressional action on state tax issues, the 
probability of legislation addressing the e-commerce issue seems small (McLure, 2005; 
Hellerstein, 1997).  Still, the SSUTA represents the most widespread policy attempt to 
remedy some of the issues associated with e-commerce.  It has in some measure helped 
lead to administrative simplification of state sales taxes and eliminated some of the 
inherent tax free shopping as a result of e-commerce (Swain & Hellerstein, 2005).  As a 
policy that has gained traction among many states, it characterizes efforts to capture 
larger tax revenue shares from e-commerce, ostensibly to increase revenues and by doing 
so reduce fiscal stress and increase financial stability.   
The results of this analysis of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement do 
indicate that there are certain characteristics of states that have made or will make them 
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more likely to adopt the SSUTA.  As expected, sales tax rates and local option sales taxes 
increase the probability of adoption, yet reliance on sales and use tax revenues and 
estimated revenue losses do not.  Some interesting policy results are found regarding 
diffusion effects and political effects.  In the case of diffusion effects, there is an opposite 
geographic effect as states with adopting neighbors are less likely to adopt, thus the 
SSUTA is a policy that does not appear to be following traditional theories of diffusion.  
These findings should merit additional scrutiny in future analyses, as they do not conform 
to traditional theories regarding policy diffusion and innovation.  Any tax coordination 
effort that seeks to deal with problems like e-commerce must also be dynamic in nature, 
reflecting technological innovations and changing consumer preferences.  These types of 
coordination across states, whether dealing with a tax issue or other policy issue, are 
likely to provide evidence as to future coordination and collaboration among the states as 
other issues come to the forefront such as environmental and healthcare policies to name 
two.  Therefore, this research on the adoption of the SSUTA is a not only a step toward 
fully analyzing this unique agreement and its ramifications for both states and online 
sellers, but analyzing the ability of states to coordinate policy actions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © James Bryan Gibson 2013 
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CHAPTER 4 
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund Solvency: An Analysis of Balances and State 
Management Practices 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 Unemployment insurance functions as a social insurance program, designed to 
provide direct financial assistance to individuals that have been laid off.  Compensation 
levels are designed to replace a portion of an individual’s lost income for a period of time 
and certain eligibility requirements must be met.  Unemployment insurance benefits are 
jointly financed by federal and state governments with taxes on employers, and were 
established in the late 1930s through the Social Security Act.  They are administered by 
state governments, which have some autonomy in determining state unemployment tax 
rates and benefit levels.   
During times of recession unemployment levels rise, which puts greater pressure 
on state unemployment insurance programs and the trust funds used to pay benefits.  As 
fewer workers are employed during a recession, claims for benefits increase, while tax 
collections used to fund the unemployment insurance programs decreases.  This type of 
response is cyclical, as tax collections will increase during times of economic growth, 
while claims for benefits decrease.  Depending on the balance levels in state 
unemployment trust funds at the onset of a recession, many states may exhaust these 
funds and must turn to the federal government for assistance as authorized in Title XII of 
the Social Security Act (Roberts, 2009).  In order to continue paying benefits, states 
borrow funds from the Federal Unemployment Account within the Unemployment Trust 
Fund, and these loans must be paid back with interest after a certain time period.  The 
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risk of paying out high levels of benefits while coping with lower revenues can leave 
unemployment trust funds in precarious positions, and as a result lead to fiscal stress for 
states.  The research questions and organization of this essay are introduced in the 
following two sub-sections. 
 
4.1.1 Research Questions 
 
This essay studies the structure and function of state unemployment trust funds 
and investigates determinants of both fund balances and loans taken from the federal 
government.  The issue of unemployment insurance and the ability of states to meet their 
benefit obligations have come under increased scrutiny due to the persistently high rates 
of unemployment that have been experienced during the Great Recession (Katz, 2010; 
Elsby, Hobijn, & Sahin, 2010).  States that maintain adequate unemployment insurance 
trust fund balances can increase their financial stability and reduce the likelihood of fund 
insolvency.  This lessens the probability that a state will have to borrow from the federal 
government in order to meet benefit obligations.  Much of the literature on 
unemployment insurance has focused on the optimal length of benefits, how benefits 
affect employment decisions and the unemployment rate, and the economic impacts of 
benefits.  State management of trust funds and the determinants of trust fund balances 
over time have not been examined, and this essay seeks to fill this gap in the literature.  
Thus, the research questions for this essay are as follows:  
(1) How do state unemployment insurance policies impact state unemployment trust fund 
balances? 
(2) What policy factors influence the likelihood that a state will have to borrow from the 
federal trust fund?   
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4.1.2 Essay Organization 
 
This essay is organized in the following manner.  Section two is a board narrative 
of state unemployment insurance programs with sub-sections on tax structure, 
administration, and benefits, various unemployment statistics and trends, and an 
examination of trust funds and solvency measures.  Section three contains a review of the 
literature on unemployment insurance trust funds including potential reform proposals.  
There is also a discussion of the impact of unemployment insurance on unemployment 
rates and the job search.  Section four contains the empirical analysis of unemployment 
trust funds, which includes data sources, models, methodology, and results.  Finally, 
section five concludes by examining the policy implications of the findings.  
 
4.2 Background on State Unemployment Insurance Programs  
 
 
4.2.1 Unemployment Statistics and Trends 
 
 Examining historical trends in unemployment statistics provides context for the 
analysis of state unemployment insurance trust funds.  Figure B.1 in Appendix B displays 
the monthly unemployment rate in the United States from 1948 to February of 2012.  
Shaded areas represent recessions as defined by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) and during those periods the national unemployment rate rises and in 
some cases continues to increase even after the recession is officially over.  Initial weekly 
unemployment claims from 1980 to 2011 are displayed below in Figure 4.1 and as 
expected, claims rise during periods of recession and then usually begin to decrease after 
the recession has ended, although the return to pre-recession levels appears to be a slow, 
gradual process.   
81 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Initial Weekly Unemployment Claims 
 
Sources: Department of Labor, NBER 
 Another important unemployment indicator, particularly for this analysis, is the 
level of benefits being paid.  Balances in state unemployment trust funds that were built 
up during times of economic growth and low unemployment are tapped to fund the 
growth in claims and corresponding benefits during a recession.  Thus, it would be 
expected that benefits paid would rise during a recession.  Figure 4.2 shows 
unemployment benefits paid (in nominal dollars) in the U.S. on a monthly basis from 
1971 through the first few months of 2012.  As expected, benefits paid rose during 
recessions and the data indicates that payments can remain high even after the recession 
officially ends, which mirrors the gradual improvement in employment rates after a 
recession. Additionally, after each recession ends, there appears to be a new, higher 
baseline that is established for benefits paid.  This ratcheting up of benefits that appears 
to occur after each recession is likely to put increased pressure on unemployment trust 
funds and cause future insolvency issues.  Particularly interesting is that Figure 4.2 
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indicates states have paid out historically high levels of benefits during the Great 
Recession.  This could be attributed to persistently high levels of unemployment and the 
extension of benefits to 99 weeks.  Although the data does not yet indicate if a newer 
average baseline of benefits paid has emerged after the Great Recession, but if another 
increase occurs, states will be increasingly vulnerable from future recessions.  
 
Figure 4.2: Unemployment Benefits Paid (nominal) 
 
Sources: Department of Labor, NBER 
The long term unemployment rate, or those out of work 27 weeks or more, has reached 
well over four percent as seen in Figure B.2 in Appendix B.  This indicates that many 
benefit recipients are relying on unemployment insurance for longer periods of time and 
this can have future economic implications (Aaronson, Mazmuder, and Schechter, 2010).  
This measure also reached historically high levels during the Great Recession, indicating 
that unemployment trust funds were likely a source of fiscal stress for states. 
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4.2.2 Tax Structure, Administration, and Benefits 
 
Unemployment insurance programs arose out of the Social Security Act of 1935, 
which provided tax incentives under Title III for states to enact these programs 
(Whittaker, 2010).  In two years, the current 48 states at the time, and future states Alaska 
and Hawaii had established unemployment insurance laws.32  Unemployment insurance 
is jointly-financed by federal and state unemployment taxes on employers.  Employers 
are required to pay these taxes if they meet one of two requirements: (1) payment of 
wages to employees over $1,500 in any quarter of the year or (2) they employed at least 
one worker a day of the week for any 20 weeks in the year.33  Tax rates at the state level 
are determined by each state and are authorized under the State Unemployment Tax Acts 
(SUTA).  Table 4.1 lists each state’s taxable wage base and the minimum and maximum 
unemployment tax rates from 2011. The highest rate is Maryland at over 13 percent and 
several other states including Massachusetts, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Michigan, and Wyoming all have maximum rates equal 
to or greater than 10 percent.  Several states have minimum rates of zero including Iowa, 
Missouri, Nebraska, and South Dakota.  It should be noted that most states make changes 
to tax rates at least once a year, which are dependent on trust fund balances (GAO, 2010).  
States utilize experience ratings to determine tax rates for employers with those that have 
historically laid off more workers being assessed higher rates, up to a maximum level 
(Whittaker, 2010).  The experience rating is designed to function as follows: “The 
experience rating is intended to ensure an equitable distribution of UC program taxes 
among employers and to encourage a stable workforce” (Whittaker, 2010, p.2).   
32 A more detailed history of unemployment insurance can be found in Larson and Murray (1954) and 
Vroman (1998) p.5-33. 
33 Source: Internal Revenue Service: Publication 15, Section 15. 
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Table 4.1: Unemployment Tax Rates by State, 2011 
 Wages Subject to Tax Minimum Rate Maximum Rate 
Alabama $8,000 0.59% 6.74% 
Alaska $34,600 1.0% 5.4% 
Arizona  $7,000 0.02% 5.86% 
Arkansas $12,000 1.0% 6.9% 
California $7,000 1.5% 6.2% 
Colorado $10,000 1.0% 5.4% 
Connecticut $15,000 1.9% 6.8% 
Delaware $10,500 0.1% 8.0% 
Florida $7,000 1.03% 5.4% 
Georgia $8,500 0.025% 5.4% 
Hawaii $34,200 1.2% 5.4% 
Idaho  $33,300 0.96% 6.8% 
Illinois $12,740 0.7% 8.4% 
Indiana $9,500 0.7% 9.5% 
Iowa $24,700 0.0% 9.0% 
Kansas $8,000 0.11% 7.4% 
Kentucky $8,000 1.0% 10.0% 
Louisiana $7,700 0.11% 6.2% 
Maine $12,000 0.86% 7.95% 
Maryland $8,500 2.2% 13.5% 
Massachusetts $14,000 1.26% 12.27% 
Michigan $9,000 0.06% 10.3% 
Minnesota $27,000 0.5% 9.4% 
Mississippi $14,000 0.85% 5.4% 
Missouri $13,000 0.0% 9.75% 
Montana $26,300 0.82% 6.12% 
Nebraska  $9,000 0.0% 8.66% 
Nevada $26,600 0.25% 5.4% 
New Hampshire $12,000 0.01% 7.0% 
New Jersey $29,600 0.5% 5.8% 
New Mexico $21,900 0.05% 5.4% 
New York $8,500 1.5% 9.9% 
North Carolina $19,700 0.24% 6.84% 
North Dakota $25,500 0.2% 10.0% 
Ohio $9,000 0.7% 9.6% 
Oklahoma $18,600 0.3% 7.5% 
Oregon $32,300 2.2% 5.4% 
Pennsylvania $8,000 2.68% 10.82% 
Rhode Island $19,000 1.69% 9.79% 
South Carolina $10,000 0.1% 11.28% 
South Dakota $11,000 0.0% 9.5% 
Tennessee $9,000 0.5% 10.0% 
Texas $9,000 0.78% 8.25% 
Utah $28,600 0.4% 9.4% 
Vermont  $13,000 1.3% 8.4% 
Virginia $8,000 0.77% 6.87% 
Washington $37,300 0.49% 6.0% 
West Virginia $12,000 1.5% 7.5% 
Wisconsin $13,000 0.27% 9.8% 
Wyoming $22,300 0.67% 10.0% 
Source: Tax Policy Center 
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The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) authorizes the IRS to collect the 
federal unemployment tax.  Revenues from FUTA go into the federal unemployment 
trust fund.  Shaw and Stone (2010) provide specifics on the various functions of the trust 
fund.   
“The fund is maintained in four accounts, each of which has a specific purpose: 
(1) financing the administrative costs to the states of providing unemployment 
benefits and offering job location and information service; (2) paying the federal 
share of the Extended Benefits program; (3) making loans to state unemployment 
programs that run short of funds; and (4) providing benefits to former federal 
employees” (p.6).   
If balances in the trust fund reach a certain level or cap, the Reed Act, which was part of 
the Employment Security Financing Act of 1954, mandates that the federal government 
remit excess dollars to the states for use in paying unemployment benefits.  Currently, the 
FUTA tax rate is six percent of the first $7,000 paid to each employee in a calendar year.  
If employers pay on a timely basis, they can receive a 5.4 percent credit, making the 
effective rate 0.6 percent for a tax of $42 per qualified employee.   
Benefits are generally payable for 26 weeks, but can be extended by economic 
conditions.  Extensions are for 20 additional weeks via the permanent Extended Benefits 
Program, which is funded jointly by the states and the federal government (Shaw & 
Stone, 2010).   Congressional action can lengthen benefit availability even further, as 
seen during the Great Recession when unemployment insurance payments were pushed 
to 99 weeks by the creation of Emergency Unemployment Compensation.34  Benefits and 
34 See Shaw and Stone (2010), Figure 1. 
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eligibility requirements vary by state35 but Rosen (2005) notes, “In most states, the 
benefit formula is designed so that the gross replacement rate- the proportion of pretax 
earnings replaced by unemployment insurance- is about 50 percent” (p.211).  The 
average benefit for recipients of unemployment insurance is around $300 per week, but 
varies based on the state and the individual’s prior earnings history (Shaw & Stone, 
2011).  For individuals to receive benefits, they must meet some eligibility criteria such 
as having lost a job through no fault of their own, being able to take a new job, and 
having some minimum earnings at their job prior to being laid off (Shaw & Stone, 2010).  
Due to these restrictions, not all unemployed persons qualify for benefits, such as those 
who were employed on a part time basis (Hagenbaugh, 2009).   
 
4.2.3 Unemployment Insurance Trust Funds  
 
 Historically, states have had relatively strong unemployment fund reserves with 
the exception of the early 1980s recession and the Great Recession.  In fact, for the first 
20 years of the program, loans from the federal government were essentially zero.  
Inflation adjusted aggregate loans and net reserves36 for the states from 1938 to 2010 are 
in Figure 4.3 and the only time prior to the Great Recession when net reserves fell below 
zero was 1982-1983. Even after this period balances rebounded sharply and remained 
positive until the Great Recession, which has profoundly illustrated the risk facing states.  
A number of states' trust funds have run dry and they have been forced to borrow from 
the federal government in record amounts.37   
35 For more detailed information on state by state benefit determination and benefit levels see the 
Department of Labor’s Comparison of State Unemployment Laws. 
36 Net reserves equals fund balance minus outstanding loans. 
37 A more in-depth discussion of the loan process can be found in Whittaker (2010) p.7-11. 
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Figure 4.3: Aggregate State Outstanding Loans and Net Reserves, 1938-2010 
 
Source: Department of Labor 
Originally, states had only to pay back the principal on loans until 1982, when interest 
was required to be paid on loans due to a recommendation from the 1980-81 National 
Commission on Unemployment Compensation.  The interest rate on these loans is either 
10 percent or the interest rate paid on state balances in the federal Unemployment Trust 
Fund, whichever is less.  In an environment where market interest rates are lower, the 
possibility of arbitrage emerges, assuming a state could borrow money at sufficiently low 
interest rates in order to repay federal loans and avoid higher interest rates.  Historically, 
there appears to be no evidence that states have utilized this approach.  In fact, the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act had delayed interest from accruing on loans 
and automatic federal unemployment tax increases from taking place until the end of 
2010, but many states still had outstanding loans (Burnett, 2012).  According to the U.S. 
Department of Labor, at the end of 2011, 26 states had borrowed over $36 billion from 
the federal government to fund unemployment insurance programs.  In order to recoup 
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outstanding loans over two years, the FUTA tax is raised on employers in states that still 
owe money, essentially eliminating the 5.4 percent credit.  These mandatory increases in 
the FUTA tax do not cover interest on the loans, and thus further assessments may be 
applied to employers (Leachman et al., 2011).  Table 4.2 displays states with outstanding 
loans, loans per capita, and the state’s 2011 unemployment rate.  The national 
unemployment rate in 2011 was 8.9 percent, and many of the states that borrowed funds 
have rates above that. 
 
Table 4.2: Loans to States for Unemployment Benefits (as of Dec. 2011) 
 Outstanding Loans Per Capita Unemployment Rate 
Alabama $33,619,180 $7 9.0% 
Arizona $369,502,785 $57 9.5% 
Arkansas $331,991,627 $113 8.0% 
California $9,912,972,856 $263 11.7% 
Colorado $342,825,332 $67 8.3% 
Connecticut $712,561,091 $199 8.8% 
Delaware $63,499,450 $70 7.3% 
Florida $1,791,408,948 $94 10.5% 
Georgia $726,325,540 $74 9.8% 
Illinois $2,136,296,662 $166 9.8% 
Indiana $1,974,627,366 $303 9.0% 
Kansas $63,167,236 $22 6.7% 
Kentucky $956,888,964 $219 9.5% 
Minnesota $181,725,274 $34 6.4% 
Missouri $727,293,248 $121 8.6% 
Nevada $770,700,126 $283 13.5% 
New Jersey $1,464,311,730 $166 9.3% 
New York $3,445,339,869 $177 8.2% 
North Carolina $2,703,792,280 $280 10.5% 
Ohio $2,078,091,180 $180 8.6% 
Pennsylvania $3,236,693,044 $254 7.9% 
Rhode Island $228,132,534 $217 11.3% 
South Carolina $790,789,870 $169 10.3% 
Vermont $77,677,444 $124 5.6% 
Virginia $275,284,536 $34 6.2% 
Wisconsin $1,233,741,672 $216 7.5% 
Total /Average $36,629,259,844 $150 8.9% 
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, Census Bureau 
It has been estimated that by 2013, as many as 40 states will have to borrow $90 billion 
in funds (Burnett, 2011).  Leachman et al. (2011) estimate that 10 to 15 states will still be 
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insolvent in 10 years, while only 12 states will have sufficient reserves to weather another 
recession by 2020.   
There is no requirement or mandate concerning minimum state unemployment 
insurance trust fund balances, but there are several metrics that can be utilized to assess 
the sufficiency of fund balances.  The simplest measure is the reserve ratio, which takes 
the trust fund reserves as a fraction of a state’s total wages (National Employment Law 
Project, 2010).  This essentially compares the size of the state’s economy with its 
reserves.  Another measure comes from the Department of Labor’s guidelines for 
solvency, which suggest that a state should have sufficient funds to pay for one year of 
benefits based on the three highest yearly payouts made by the state over the last 20 
years.  This is referred to as the average high cost multiple, or AHCM.  It is calculated by 
taking the reserve ratio over the average of the three highest benefit payout years in the 
last 20 years as a percentage of the covered wages in that period.  Covered wages are 
those that would be eligible for unemployment benefits if the individual was laid off.  A 
ratio greater than one is usually indicative of a state’s ability to pay for 12 months of 
benefits during a recession (Roberts, 2009).  Values less than one raise insolvency 
concerns, as a state could exhaust its available funds in a recession.  It is clear that many 
states had insufficient balances in their unemployment trust funds even during years of 
economic expansion, when balances should theoretically be increasing in preparation for 
the next recession.  The high cost multiple, which differs slightly from the AHCM, takes 
the reserve ratio over the highest yearly benefits ever paid out as a percentage of covered 
wages for that year.  Combining these measures of trust fund adequacy across the states 
in Figure 4.4 from 1971 to 2010 shows an overall downward trend, albeit with some 
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variation, since the recession of the early 1990s.  The high water mark for all three 
measures is the beginning of the data sample in 1971, which indicates a gradual decline 
in trust fund solvency over the past three decades. 
 
Figure 4.4: Reserve Ratio, High Cost Multiple, and Average High Cost Multiple, 
1971-2010 
 
Source: Department of Labor 
 
 Strategies to manage unemployment insurance and maintain fund solvency have 
varied across states.  States have reduced benefits and the length that individuals can 
draw benefits, while some have even raised taxes on employers or expanded the taxable 
wage base.  Regardless of the metric used to asses trust fund balances, it is clear that 
funds have been depleted by the Great Recession and states have been forced to borrow 
from the federal trust fund.   
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4.3 Literature Review 
 
Much of the literature on unemployment insurance is focused on how benefits 
affect the unemployment rate, length of unemployment spells, and economic impacts.  
Some questions have been raised regarding the effect of unemployment benefits on 
unemployment levels and duration of unemployment spells.38  Search theory posits that 
an increase in benefits causes workers to search longer and thus prolongs unemployment 
spells (Ehrenburg & Oaxaca, 1976; Mortensen, 1977).  Some analyses have found that 
extending the length of benefits can increase unemployment levels or the duration of 
unemployment spells, but these effects have generally been found to be fairly small 
(Atkinson & Micklewright, 1991; Card & Levine, 2000; Mazmuder, 2011; Moffitt, 1985; 
Fujita, 2011; Rothstein, 2011; Valletta & Kuang, 2010; Ehrenberg & Oaxaca, 1976; Katz 
& Meyer, 1990; Moffitt & Nicholson, 1982).   It has also been postulated that extended 
benefits may allow workers more time to search for jobs that better match their skill set 
(Rosen, 2005) and that decreasing benefits would lead to a decrease in welfare and output 
due to workers being unable to selectively seek high productivity employment 
opportunities (Acemoglu & Shimer, 2000).  Higher benefit levels can also decrease the 
probability that an individual will leave the ranks of the unemployed (Meyer, 1990). 
Outside of providing unemployed workers with a level of sustenance and a 
stabilizing effect on family income, another more indirect function of unemployment 
insurance programs is to serve as an automatic economic stabilizer in the macro economy 
(Vroman, 2009).  Vroman (1998) details this process as follows:  
38 For theoretical discussions on the optimal length of benefits see Shavell and Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn 
and Nicolini (1997), Hansen & Imrohoroglu (1992), and Atkeson and Lucas (1995).  For a survey of early 
empirical work see Welch (1977). 
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“Trust fund balances are built up before recessions, drawn on during recessions, 
and then rebuilt during the subsequent recoveries.  The funding arrangement 
implies that the program acts as an automatic stabilizer of economic activity, that 
it makes larger benefit payments than tax withdrawals during recessions and 
larger tax withdrawals that benefit payments during economic expansions” (p.10).  
 When the economy enters a recessionary period, individuals that are laid off have 
reduced purchasing power and the economy as a whole suffers from reduced consumer 
demand.  Unemployment benefits would maintain the ability of individuals to purchase 
goods and services and provide some level of economic activity during a recession 
(CanagaRetna, 2010), which could be described as consumption smoothing (Gruber, 
1997).  Shaw and Stone (2010) explain that the function of the unemployment benefits 
system is not only a means to support individuals that lose their jobs, but to “sustain 
consumer demand during economic downturns by providing a continuing stream of 
dollars for families to spend” (p.1).  Douglas Elmendorf (2011), the director of the 
Congressional Budget Office, testified to Congress that extending unemployment aid 
would help economic growth.  “Households receiving unemployment benefits tend to 
spend the additional benefits quickly, making this option both timely and cost-effective in 
spurring demand for goods and services, and thereby economic activity and employment” 
(p.26).  Unemployment benefits can thus serve two purposes, helping to stabilize the 
economy and maintain some level of sustenance for unemployed workers.   
Solvency of state unemployment trust funds is often most precarious during or 
after recessions, when these funds are depleted.  Policymakers, and scholars to some 
extent, examine why this occurs and some possible solutions to increase the viability of 
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trust funds in the future.  Increases in unemployment and the subsequent claims and 
benefits that must be paid during a recession can lead to solvency issues for trust funds 
that are not adequately funded.  A second, less visible reason is a decrease in the wages 
that are subject to unemployment taxes.  This can be attributed to failing businesses, a 
smaller pool of employed workers that can be taxed, and a low taxable wage base 
(National Employment Law Project, 2010; Vroman 2009).  GAO (2010) findings indicate 
that only 17 states index their taxable wage base and those that do have a wage base that 
is two times greater than non-indexing states.  This allows states with indexed bases to 
tax a greater wage base than non-indexed states, which in turn should leave their trust 
fund balances in a stronger position.  The difference between indexed and non-indexed 
wage bases across states can be seen in Figure 4.5, which shows the percentage of total 
wages that are subject to unemployment taxes under an indexed wage base and a non-
indexed wage base.  The indexed base has remained fairly steady over the time period 
from 1979 to 2008, while the non-indexed base has decreased. 
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Figure 4.5: Indexed and Non-Indexed Wage Bases, 1979-2008 
 
Source: GAO (2010) Table 9 
 
 Poor management of unemployment trust funds has also contributed to the 
problems currently facing states (National Employment Law Project, 2010).  A GAO 
(2010) report attributes problems in trust funds to bad tax policies over the last 30 years, 
such as the erosion of the taxable wage base noted by others, as well as insufficient tax 
rates.  Furthermore, enhanced benefits have also contributed to the decline in fund 
solvency (CanagaRetna, 2010).  In this case, benefit generosity can also be linked to the 
adequacy of a state’s trust fund, with those states nearing insolvency being less likely to 
offer generous benefits than other states in a more secure financial position (Vroman, 
1990).  The combination of issues listed has led to a lack of sufficient savings to deal 
with increased benefit payments during a recession (Leachman et al., 2011).  However, 
this is not the first warning that has been issued regarding the viability of unemployment 
insurance programs (GAO, 1988; GAO, 1993), yet policies have remained largely 
unchanged.   
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 Potential solutions offered by the GAO were to raise and/or index the FUTA 
taxable wage base, adjust state tax rates, and raise target reserve levels.39  Some other 
policy proposals to increase the solvency of trust funds include creating incentives for 
states to increase trust fund balances, such as interest rate increases for minimum balance 
levels, and increasing federal money to states that is used for administration of benefits 
and job service programs (Vroman, 2009).  Leachman et al. (2011) detail a plan to 
rebuild the solvency of trust funds that combines some of these proposals.  They propose 
to raise the taxable wage base, excuse some loans for states that enter agreements with 
the federal government to build their trust funds back to adequate levels, and offer federal 
incentives to states that maintain adequate trust fund balances.  Proposals put forth by the 
Department of Labor center around providing states with interest-free loans if they met 
certain criteria, such as having an AHCM of one in at least one of the five prior years or 
meeting certain average tax rate goals (National Employment Law Project, 2010).  
CanagaRetna (2010) cites Oregon as having a model unemployment insurance program 
which includes yearly increases in the taxable wage base, higher tax rates, and a hands-
off legislative approach to taxes and benefit levels. 
Although much of the literature has focused on other aspects of unemployment 
insurance, the analyses and proposals offered on trust fund solvency have begun to fill an 
important area in the literature.  A number of proposals that were highlighted previously 
aim to improve the current and future prospects of state unemployment trust funds, and 
by doing so, also improve state financial stability.  Given the importance of adequate 
unemployment trust funds and the fiscal stress facing states due to the Great Recession, 
39 For more detail on proposals for unemployment insurance funding see GAO (2010) Table 6, p.25. 
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analyzing how state management impacts fund solvency and potential borrowing is a 
pertinent issue in state government finance. 
 
4.4 Empirical Analysis 
 
 The empirical analysis seeks to broaden the understanding how state policies 
impact unemployment insurance trust fund balances utilizing two empirical approaches.  
The level of fund balances per state and the incidence of loan occurrences will measure 
both the effect of state policies on fund balances, and the likelihood of a state having to 
procure a loan from the federal government in the future.  The nature of unemployment 
insurance programs allows states latitude when setting rates and benefits, among other 
aspects of the program.  State governance can then play a significant role in determining 
fund solvency.  The two research questions lead to a set of testable hypotheses regarding 
state governance effects on fund balances and the propensity of needing a loan from the 
federal trust fund.  The first set of hypotheses arises from the initial research question and 
the evidence from prior analyses.  The focus is on determining the impact of state policy 
choices on unemployment trust fund balances, and ultimately what possible policy 
changes could improve fund solvency. 
H1: States with a greater average tax rate will have greater trust fund balances. 
H2: States with a larger taxable wage base will have greater trust fund balances. 
H3: States that pay higher average weekly benefits and have longer benefit durations will 
have lower trust fund balances. 
The second set of hypotheses mirrors the first, with the exception that in this case state 
policies are affecting the probability of a state having to borrow from the federal trust 
fund. 
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H4: States with a greater average tax rate will be less likely to borrow from the federal 
trust fund. 
H5: States with a larger taxable wage base will be less likely to borrow from the federal 
trust fund. 
H6: States that pay higher average weekly benefits and have longer benefit durations will 
be more likely to borrow from the federal trust fund. 
These two sets of hypotheses will be empirically tested using a data set that is defined in 
the next subsection. 
 
4.4.1 Model Specification 
 
The empirical analysis is a two-pronged approach.  First, a panel of 
unemployment insurance trust fund balances will be regressed against a number of 
determinants, including state policies, to determine what affects overall trust fund 
balances.  Secondly, a limited dependent variable model for outstanding loans from the 
federal government will be utilized with a similar set of independent variables to 
determine what variables affect the probability that a state will become insolvent and 
have to take out a loan from the federal trust fund.  A fixed effects model is used to 
control for unobserved cross-state variations.  The first model is specified below in 
equation one. 
(1) UTFBalancesit= β0 + β1Sit + β2Pit + β3Eit + δi + εit      
UTFBalances are state i’s unemployment trust fund balances per capita in real 2010 
dollars for year t.  State i’s fixed effect is represented by δi.  The variables of most 
interest when testing the hypotheses are state policies and measures, which are in vector 
S.  Political and ideological variables are included in vector P to control for any impacts 
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these may have on the benefits and management of state unemployment funds.  
Economic variables such as state Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the various 
components of state GDP for state i in year t are in vector E.  Finally, ε is the 
idiosyncratic error term.   
The second model utilizes a limited dependent variable approach to analyze when 
a state has been forced to acquire a loan from the federal unemployment trust fund.  This 
approach is modeled in equation two and will estimate the probability of a state having to 
acquire a loan from the federal government in a given year.   
(2) UTFLoanit= α1Sit + α2Pit + α3Eit + ε 
UTFLoan is a binary variable which indicates whether a state i had to borrow from the 
federal unemployment trust fund in year t.  If the state had to acquire a loan in year t, then 
UTFLoan is assigned a value of one, if no loans were taken the value is zero.  The 
remaining variables represented by vectors S, P, and E remain the same as in equation 
one.  The variables and data sources for both models are discussed below in section 4.4.2 
and shown in Table 4.3. 
 
4.4.2 Data 
 
A panel dataset is assembled in order to empirically test the hypotheses.  Two 
dependent variables are used; the first is real unemployment trust fund balances per 
capita (adjusted to 2010 dollars), while the second is a dummy variable with states that 
borrowed from the federal government in a given year being assigned values of one and 
all others a zero.  Explanatory variables of interest will be elements of state policy 
governing unemployment insurance programs.  Data on the dependent variables as well 
as variables concerning state policy are gathered from the Department of Labor’s 
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Unemployment Insurance Financial Data Handbook.  Other control variables will 
include political and economic aspects that may affect trust fund balances.  The variables 
that govern and measure state unemployment insurance programs arise from the 
hypotheses.  These variables of interest include: the real average weekly benefit, the real 
taxable wage base, average duration of benefits (in weeks), and the average tax rate.  Any 
indexing of the taxable wage base to inflation by states will be captured in the real 
taxable wage base.  Politics could also influence how a state structures its unemployment 
insurance program.  In order to control for political influences, variables of party control 
of the governor’s office and both legislative chambers are included.  Control of the 
governor’s office by party is a dummy variable for a Democrat in office.  Control of the 
lower and upper legislative chambers are also dummy variables, with a value of one for 
Democrat-controlled houses and zero for Republican control.  A measure of government 
ideology is included to account for ideological impacts.  This measure is referred to as the 
“NOMINATE measure of state government ideology” which was developed by Berry, 
Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, and Klarner (2010).  Lastly, a measure of citizen ideology is 
included in the model to attempt to capture some citizenry preferences regarding rainy 
day funds and savings that may be present in ideological leanings.  The measure is 
referred to as the “revised 1960-2010 citizen ideology series” which was originally 
constructed by Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998) and has been updated since.  
Both are measured on a scale from zero to 100, with more conservative ideologies being 
closer to zero and more liberal ideologies being closer to 100.  The most basic economic 
control dealing with unemployment trust funds is the unemployment rate.  States with 
lower unemployment rates will be expected to have higher trust fund balances, ceteris 
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paribus, as they would be paying out less in benefits.   Income is also measured on a per 
capita personal basis to control for incomes across states.  Various components of state 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as well as real GDP per capita are included to account for 
differences in economies and economic bases between states as well as the effects that 
different industries have on unemployment.  The components are included as a 
percentage of total state GDP and include manufacturing, retail trade, finance, real estate, 
and government.  These were chosen as they represented the five largest average 
components of GDP across all states and together, on average, constituted over 50 
percent of state GDP.  The variables are shown in Table 4.3 along with a description and 
data source.  The time period for analysis runs from 1982, when the federal government 
began charging interest on outstanding state unemployment loans, through 2010.  
Nebraska is excluded from the data set due to its unicameral legislature.   
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Table 4.3: Variables, Variable Description, and Data Source 
Variable  Description Source 
Unemployment Trust Fund 
Balances Real trust fund balances per capita Department of Labor 
Unemployment Trust Fund 
Loans 
1= trust fund loan from federal 
government, 0= none Department of Labor 
State Policies and Measures 
Average Tax Rate  As percentage of taxable wages Department of Labor 
Taxable Wage Base 
Size of wage base subject to 
unemployment taxes Department of Labor 
Average Weekly Benefit State's average benefit payment Department of Labor 
Average Benefit Duration 
Average weekly length of benefit 
payments Department of Labor 
Political Measures 
Governor 1= Democrat, 0= other Statistical Abstract 
House 1= Democrat control, 0= other Statistical Abstract 
Senate 1= Democrat control, 0= other Statistical Abstract 
 
Economic Measures 
Unemployment Rate Average yearly unemployment rate Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Log Real GDP Per Capita Log of Real GDP per capita Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Manufacturing 
Percentage of GDP from 
manufacturing Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Retail Trade Percentage of GDP from retail trade Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Finance Percentage of GDP from finance Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Real Estate Percentage of GDP from real estate Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Government 
Percentage of GDP from 
government Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
After this adjustment, the data set contains 1,421 observations.  Summary statistics for 
the variables are shown in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean  Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables 
Log of Real Unemployment Trust Fund Balances Per Capita 0.20 0.15 0 0.70 
Unemployment Trust Fund Loans 0.11 0.31 0 1 
State Policies and Measures 
Real Average Weekly Benefit 272.98 47.83 166.34 436.46 
Real Taxable Wage Base  16132.20 7160.22 7000 44912.40 
Average Duration of Benefits 14.33 2.62 5.40 27.10 
Average Tax Rate 0.01 0.004 0.001 0.03 
Political Measures 
Governor 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Senate 0.57 0.50 0 1 
House 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Government Ideology  52.39 21.46 0 93.16 
Citizen Ideology 50.34 15.25 8.45 95.97 
Economic Measures 
Unemployment Rate 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.17 
Log Real GDP Per Capita 10.57 0.22 9.99 11.68 
Manufacturing 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.34 
Retail Trade 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.12 
Finance 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.39 
Real Estate 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.20 
Government  0.14 0.03 0.08 0.26 
 
 
4.4.3 Results 
 
The first model utilizing real unemployment trust fund balances per capita as the 
dependent variable is run using a fixed effects regression approach after a Hausman 
Test40 indicates that fixed effects would be an appropriate approach.  This indicates that 
there is a strong correlation between the residuals and the model’s predicted values.  The 
results from the Hausman Test are shown in Table B.1 in Appendix B.  The fixed effects 
model controls for unobserved state differences across the data.  The Modified Wald 
Test41 for groupwise heteroskedasticity reveals the presence of heteroskedasticity, thus 
the model is estimated using robust standard errors.  The results of the regression with 
40 The Hausman Test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients that are estimated by the random effects 
model are the same as the coefficients that are estimates by the fixed effects model.  If the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected, then random effects can be used as a more efficient estimation technique.  In this case, 
the null hypothesis is rejected and fixed effects are utilized. 
41 The Modified Wald Test tests the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity or constant variance.  The test 
results here reject the null and thus robust standard errors are employed. 
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real unemployment trust fund balances per capita as the dependent variable are shown in 
Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5: Fixed Effects Regression Results 
  Coeff. Robust S.E. 
State Policies and Measures 
Real Taxable Wage Base 0.007 0.003 ** 
Real Average Weekly Benefit -0.044 0.023 * 
Average Tax Rate -11.07 1.882 *** 
Average Duration of Benefits -0.011 0.003 *** 
Political Measures 
Citizen Ideology -0.18 0.044  
Government Ideology -0103 0.075  
Senate 0.015 0.009  
House 0.004 0.019  
Governor 0.036 0.024  
Economic Measures 
Unemployment Rate -1.951 0.360 *** 
Log Real GDP Per Capita 0.191 0.098 *** 
Manufacturing 0.219 0.195  
Retail Trade 2.067 0.603 *** 
Finance 0.051 0.382  
Real Estate -0.723 0.544  
Government 0.010 1.012   
N= 1421    
R-squared=0.54    
F(18,48)=34.55  ***       
Note: Real Average Weekly Benefit, Citizen Ideology, and Government Ideology are in hundreds; Real 
Taxable Wage Base is in thousands 
*Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
 
Several state policy measures are significant in the results including the real taxable wage 
base, the average tax rate, and the average duration of benefits.  The real taxable wage 
base increase unemployment trust fund balances per capita, although the magnitude of 
the increases on a per dollar basis is relatively small.  As expected, a longer average 
duration of benefits for recipients decreases balances with each additional week leading 
to a decrease in trust fund balances by one cent per capita.  The magnitude of a dollar 
increase in average weekly benefits is quite small, but consider an increase in benefits of 
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$100 per week.  Such an increase would result in a decrease in trust fund balances of four 
cents per capita.   As individuals are able to draw unemployment benefits for a longer 
period of time, then the state has fewer reserve balances in its trust fund.  Interestingly, 
higher tax rates have a negative impact on trust fund balances.  This could be indicative 
of states that often have higher unemployment rates charging higher tax rates to 
compensate for greater unemployment claims.  In such a case, states may have higher tax 
rates, but lower unemployment trust fund balances due to traditionally higher 
unemployment rates.  Additionally, there is the possibility of reverse causality in this 
result due to the experience ratings that states use to determine employer tax rates.  When 
employers lay off more individuals, then the experience rating results in a higher tax rate 
for the employer, which could explain the result here of higher tax rates leading to lower 
trust fund balances.  The political and ideological control variables are all statistically 
insignificant in the regression, indicating that politics and ideology do not influence 
unemployment trust fund balances per capita.  However, several economic control 
measures are shown to affect trust fund balances.  As expected, higher unemployment 
rates lead to lower trust fund balances per capita.  An increase in the unemployment rate 
of one percent lowers trust fund balances by nearly two cents per capita.  With more 
unemployed workers, there will likely be more claims for benefits and those benefit 
payments result in lower balances.  The log of real GDP per capita has a positive impact 
on fund balances, indicating that states with better economies as measured by GDP are 
better positioned to maintain strong trust funds.  Inherently, these states are likely to need 
higher balances than states with poorer economic situations.  As for components of GDP, 
the only statistically significant effect is from retail trade, which indicates that states with 
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a greater reliance on retail trade as part of their economic base have higher 
unemployment trust fund balances per capita. 
 The second model uses a binary dependent variable, with states that had to borrow 
from the federal trust fund being assigned values of one.  When estimated using a limited 
dependent variable approach, the unobserved propensity toward borrowing is estimated 
using the binary variable.  This model is estimated using a conditional fixed effects panel 
logistic approach.  Probit fixed effects models can be run with variables controlling for 
each panel, but these unconditional fixed effects estimates are biased.  Using the logistic 
fixed effects approach does reduce the sample size from 1421 to 1102, but is not 
significant enough to cause any concern.  The results utilizing the binary dependent 
variable for loans are shown in Table 4.6.  Focus is on the signs of the coefficients and 
the significance of the variables.  The statistically significant state policies are the real 
taxable wage base, the real average weekly benefit and the average tax rate.  The signs on 
the coefficients for weekly benefits and tax rates indicate that states with higher benefits 
and higher tax rates are more likely to have to borrow from the federal trust fund.  The 
coefficient on the taxable wage base indicates that states with larger taxable wage bases 
are less likely to have to borrow from the federal trust fund.  Again, the tax rate finding 
results seem counterintuitive, but could indicate that states with higher tax rates are those 
that experience more fiscal stress due to higher unemployment rates or is the result of 
reverse causality due to experience ratings.  None of the political or ideological variables 
are significant, which mirrors the results from the first regression.   
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Table 4.6: Logistic Fixed Effects Regression Results 
  Coeff. S.E.   
State Policies and Measures 
Real Taxable Wage Base -0.092 0.055 * 
Real Average Weekly Benefit 1.519 0.784 * 
Average Tax Rate 190.804 61.346 *** 
Average Duration of Benefits 0.104 0.136  
Political Measures 
Citizen Ideology -2.076 2.141  
Government Ideology 0.199 2.255  
Senate -0.489 0.534  
House 0.373 0.476  
Governor -0.383 0.655  
Economic Measures 
Unemployment Rate 111.454 17.110 *** 
Log Real GDP Per Capita -4.305 3.636  
Manufacturing -4.133 7.894  
Retail Trade -41.772 25.742  
Finance -13.540 9.783  
Real Estate 15.599 18.903  
Government -43.429 23.950 * 
N= 1102       
LR chi2(18)= 430.53 ***       
Note: Real Average Weekly Benefit, Citizen Ideology, and Government Ideology are in hundreds; Real 
Taxable Wage Base is in thousands 
*Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
 
A number of economic measures are statistically significant in the logistic regression.  
The unemployment rate is the only variable that increases the probability of a state 
having to borrow.  The only economic variables that decreases the probability of 
borrowing is GDP derived from government.   
 When utilizing a logistic fixed effects model, default marginal effects cannot be 
calculated.  Instead, the marginal effects are calculated as a linear prediction, which still 
enables the policy impacts to be examined.  The results of the marginal effects are 
displayed in Table 4.7.  State policies affecting the probability of that a federal loan will 
be needed are the taxable wage base, average weekly benefit, and the tax rate.  If a state 
increased its taxable wage base by $1000, then it would reduce its probability of taking a 
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loan by nine percent.  An increase in average weekly benefits of one dollar increases the 
probability of a state becoming insolvent and having to take a loan from the federal trust 
fund by approximately one and a half percent.  Finally, a tax rate increase of one percent 
increases the probability of taking a loan by just under two percent.  As noted in the 
logistic regression results and the marginal effects results, none of the political or 
ideological variables are statistically significant. 
 
Table 4.7: Logistic Marginal Effects Results 
  dydx S.E.   
State Policies and Measures 
Real Taxable Wage Base -0.092 0.055 * 
Real Average Weekly Benefit 1.519 0.784 * 
Average Tax Rate 190.804 61.346 *** 
Average Duration of Benefits 0.104 0.136  
Political Measures 
Citizen Ideology -2.076 2.141  
Government Ideology 0.199 2.256  
Senate -0.489 0.534  
House 0.373 0.476  
Governor -0.383 0.655  
Economic Measures 
Unemployment Rate 111.454 17.11 *** 
Log Real GDP Per Capita -4.305 3.636  
Manufacturing -4.133 7.894  
Retail Trade -41.772 25.742  
Finance -13.540 9.783  
Real Estate 15.599 18.903  
Government -43.429 23.950 * 
Note: Real Average Weekly Benefit, Citizen Ideology, and Government Ideology are in hundreds; Real 
Taxable Wage Base is in thousands 
 
The two economic measures that are statistically significant are the unemployment rate 
and GDP from government, with opposite effects.  As would be expected, an increase in 
the unemployment rate has a positive effect on the probability of a trust fund becoming 
insolvent.  A one percent increase in the unemployment rate has just over a one percent 
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impact on the probability of a state borrowing from the federal trust fund.  GDP from 
government has a much lower impact on the probability of borrowing. 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
 With the Great Recession and its persistently high unemployment rates draining 
many state unemployment trust funds, it is important to examine unemployment policies 
and their effects on fund balances and the propensity to have to borrow from the federal 
government’s unemployment trust fund.  The literature demonstrated the importance of 
unemployment insurance as part of the social safety net, and its economic impacts.  
Maintaining viable, solvent programs into the future may require state policy changes.  
 The results from both models indicate that there a number of applicable future 
policy changes that could increase the solvency of state unemployment trust funds.  
States that had larger taxable wage bases had greater fund reserves, as the results from the 
fixed effects model reveal.  Certainly, wage bases can be adjusted at set periods by state 
policymakers, but by building in automatic adjustments such as indexing to inflation, 
these changes do not require any further action, thereby helping the wage base to keep 
pace with inflation.  By having wage bases keep pace with inflation, trust fund reserves 
are more likely to be adequate to meet future benefit needs and lessen the need to borrow 
from the federal trust fund.  The average duration of benefits could also be adjusted, yet 
such a change may have a detrimental effect on those drawing benefits, particularly the 
long term unemployed.  Interestingly, higher unemployment tax rates were associated 
with lower reserves and increased borrowing probabilities.  This may be a result of states 
responding to fiscal stress from higher unemployment rates by raising tax rates to 
compensate.  Additionally, states that have historically seen higher unemployment levels, 
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and as a result higher benefit payments, may also adjust their tax rates accordingly.  This 
type of response would indicate that states that experience greater fiscal stress from 
unemployment trust fund solvency often turn to tax rates first, rather than other program 
policies such as the taxable wage base, benefit duration, or benefit levels.  As the Great 
Recession has ended, the long term unemployment rate has remained at historical highs 
and making such changes at this juncture may not be a socially optimal outcome.  
However, the examination of state unemployment trust funds shows that it may be 
necessary to make structural changes to ensure the solvency of these funds into the 
future.   
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CHAPTER 5 
Summary and Future Research 
 
5.1 Dissertation Summary 
 
 The importance of managing state government finances and the many issues 
facing budgeters and policymakers has been compounded in recent years due to tighter 
budgets and increased public scrutiny.  In this environment it is incumbent upon state 
governments to transparently and adequately manage budgets.  In order to maximize 
efficiencies in budgeting and maintain public trust, dealing with fiscal stress and 
developing policy responses to mitigate risk are integral to the financial process.  This 
dissertation contained three essays that addressed three unique topics relating to fiscal 
stress and the ability of policy responses to increase financial stability in state 
governments. 
 Chapter two examined the relationship between fiscal stress, quantified as 
revenue volatility, and rainy day funds from 2000 through 2010.  As a countercyclical 
planning tool, these funds are designed to allow states to save excess revenues during 
times of economic expansion for use during recessionary times, when revenues are 
insufficient.  In order to function as intended, it is incumbent upon states to save adequate 
reserves to meet their budgetary needs.  It was anticipated that states that had more 
volatile budgetary environments would save more reserves in their rainy day funds in 
order to mitigate such volatility in the budget process.  Utilizing several approaches to 
compare rainy day fund balances against a number of measures this chapter reveals that 
generally there is no connection between budgetary volatility and the size of a state's 
fund.  Joyce's (2001) index of volatility was reconstituted and compared to rainy day fund 
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balances.  Additionally, actual tax revenues were used to forecast a trend line by which to 
analyze deviations, in particular negative deviations, which would indicate that a state 
collected lower revenues than would have been predicted using a time trend forecast.  
Both of these approaches yielded no strong evidence that state rainy day fund size was 
related to the index of volatility or negative deviations from a time trend forecast.  The 
residuals from the forecast trend line were then taken as a percentage of general 
expenditures and compared to rainy day fund balances while controlling for other impacts 
using a state fixed effects regression.  The results indicated that states with larger rainy 
day funds had positive revenue deviations from the forecast.  This finding showed that 
states with greater rainy day fund balances were those that had excess revenues, as 
indicated by actual revenues exceeding those from the forecast trend line.  Such a result is 
not entirely counterintuitive, as those states may deposit some excess revenue in their 
rainy day funds.  On the other hand, states with negative deviations may be less inclined 
to appropriate money for their rainy day fund or even draw down their fund in the face of 
budget shortfalls, which are likely to correspond with negative revenue deviations.  
 Chapter three analyzed the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement as a policy 
response to lost tax revenue from e-commerce.  As online shopping has experienced rapid 
growth in recent years, estimates of revenue losses to state governments have mounted.  
The issue of collecting sales taxes from online retailers on sales to consumers located 
where the business does not have a physical location, or nexus, cannot be completely 
resolved absent Congressional action.  In lieu of Congressional action, the Streamlined 
Sales and Use Tax Agreement represents a second best policy response to the fiscal stress 
caused by uncollected tax revenues.  The agreement does not compel online retailers to 
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collect and remit sales taxes, as states have no legal standing to do so, rather it simplifies 
rates and product definitions to make compliance less burdensome for online sellers, and 
thus encourage collection of applicable taxes.  Determinants of state adoptions of this 
policy from its inception in 2005 through the most recent adoption in 2011, were 
analyzed using a hazard model.  States with higher sales tax rates and local option sales 
taxes were found to be more likely to adopt this policy, while reliance on sales taxes and 
estimated e-commerce revenue losses were not.  The results indicate that states may be 
pursuing this policy due to the evidence in the literature that higher tax rates increase the 
probability of shopping online and/or to reduce the compliance burden on businesses due 
to the complexities of calculating multiple rates across jurisdictions.   
 Chapter four examined the structure and policies governing state unemployment 
trust funds.  The Great Recession revealed some inadequacies for states regarding the 
funding of their trust funds and the increased fiscal stress they may face if forced to 
borrow significant sums from the federal trust fund.  By analyzing both balances and 
borrowing history from the federal trust fund, this chapter utilizes two different angles to 
examine state policies and their impact on unemployment trust funds.  Employing both a 
panel fixed effects model and a conditional fixed effects logistic model reveal the 
significance of several aspects of state policy regarding the management of 
unemployment insurance programs and the taxing methods used to fund these programs.   
 
5.2 Future Research 
 
Various elements of fiscal stress facing state governments and the policy 
responses to it are areas that are ripe for continued research development.  In an era of 
increasingly tight resources, the causes of and responses to fiscal stress are important 
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fundamentals to managing state government finances.  First, the various budgeting 
institutions and policy responses to fiscal stress may by interrelated across different 
issues.  While it is uncertain if policymakers consider the impact of one institution on 
others, it is important to at least consider when conducting relevant research.  Although 
there is no extensive effort made to examine any relationships between the issues 
examined in this dissertation, it is worth noting the possible relationships that may exist.  
Of particular interest may be the relationship between savings or assets, such as rainy day 
funds, and other institutions that may become liabilities, such as insolvent unemployment 
trust funds.  Although the data from both essays revealed no significant correlation 
between rainy day funds and unemployment trust fund net reserves, which include loans 
as a liability, there are certainly state budget institutions that deserve examination for 
their interactions and possible implications for budgeting policy.  Other future research 
directions for each of the three essays in this dissertation are now examined with a 
particular focus on further research that can build upon the results and policy 
implications.   
Additional future research is likely needed to continue developing methods to test 
the relationship between rainy day funds and a variety of factors that may influence fund 
size and the savings decisions that are desired by both policymakers and citizens.  
Certainly there are other methods that may be employed when forecasting revenues for 
comparison with actual values such as a lag approach or exponential approach.  
Expanding the data set beyond the ten years analyzed will likely provide further insight 
into the question of the relationship between a state's budgetary and economic situation 
and its rainy day fund.  Further methods testing the volatility of each individual revenue 
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instrument against rainy day fund balances as well as utilizing other measures of revenue 
volatility may provide further evidence regarding the state policy response to fiscal stress 
in the form of rainy day funds.    
Although the essay on rainy day funds does not specifically address policy 
changes regarding tax revenue structures, such a discussion is pertinent to the issues 
surrounding countercyclical fiscal policies like rainy day funds and be of additional 
future research interest.  If a state alters its tax revenue structure, then such changes could 
lead to increased volatility, essentially leading to self-generated volatility as a result of 
tax policy decisions.  Such changes to a more volatile tax revenue structure may be 
unintentional or intentional.  In one scenario, state policy makers may unintentionally be 
increasing revenue volatility, either searching for revenue streams with greater growth 
potential, and hence greater downside risk, or seeking more palatable revenue streams to 
placate citizens.  Such a scenario would require an increase in fiscal reserves such as 
rainy day funds if the state desired to have a similar level of budget smoothing to occur.  
Yet, if the increase in volatility was unintentional, then reserves are not likely to be 
increased in a commensurate manner.  Intentional policy choices could also lead to 
increased volatility if policy makers, and ostensibly citizens, chose to utilize more 
volatile tax revenue sources as part of a state's tax revenue structure.  This type of change 
could be the result of increased tolerance of revenue volatility, and hence budget 
uncertainty.  If this were the case, then there would be no need to increase fiscal reserves 
to balance out the increased volatility, and thus rainy day fund balances would not 
appreciably grow.  In either case, there is an intrinsic link between revenue choices and 
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countercyclical fiscal policy, certainly one that should be continually developed explored 
in more detail. 
 As noted in Chapter three, a lack of Congressional action will continue to keep 
the problem of sales and use taxes and e-commerce at the forefront of state revenue 
issues.  Extensions of the analysis done in the chapter could center on adding variables 
that could differentiate between states based on the complexities of their tax bases and 
defining the salience of this issue both with legislators and citizens.  Additionally, the 
impacts of online retailers being headquartered in certain states on SSUTA adoption may 
also provide another outlet for extensions of the research done here.  Other future 
research in this arena would likely need to be focused on determining the success of the 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement at encouraging tax collection.  The ability to 
differentiate increases in revenue from this agreement versus normal economic growth 
will better allow policymakers to assess the success, or lack thereof, of this policy in their 
state.   
 The results from analyses of state unemployment trust funds in Chapter four 
provide some additional questions that deserve further investigation in the future.  
Interestingly, higher tax rates were shown to have a negative impact on unemployment 
trust fund balances.  As previously postulated, this could be due to states raising tax rates 
to compensate for higher unemployment rates, and hence higher benefit claims.  This 
result certainly warrants further research as to the interaction between unemployment 
rates, benefits paid, and the size of the taxable wage base.  If states implement changes to 
any aspects of their unemployment benefit systems as a result of the Great Recession, the 
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impacts of these changes on trust fund solvency is likely to be of great interest to 
researchers and policymakers.   
 As a whole, the three essays in the dissertation provide a number of future 
avenues for research on fiscal stress and policy responses in state government finance.  
Given the scope and importance of state government finances, this research on fiscal 
stress impacting state governments and the policy responses is both timely and relevant.  
As such, it can provide policymakers with increased knowledge regarding the issues 
facing state government finances and how to craft effective policy responses to mitigate 
fiscal stress and improve financial stability. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A.1: Summary of Rainy Day Funds and Structures 
State Established 
Replenishment 
Requirement Fund Size 
Deposit 
Rule 
Withdrawal 
Rule 
Statutory (S) 
or 
Constitutional  
Alabama  2008 Yes 10 % (E) 1 2 C 
Alaska  1986 Yes No cap 1 1 S 
Arizona  1990 
 
7% (R)  4 4 C 
Arkansas  2007 
 
$125 million 1 2 S 
California  1985 
 
No cap 2 2 S 
Colorado  1983 
 
4% (E) 3 2 C 
Connecticut  1979 
 
10% (E) 2 3 S 
Delaware  1977 
 
5% (R)  2 3 C 
Florida  1959 Yes 10% (R)  2 2 S 
Georgia  1976 
 
10% (R)  2 1 S 
Hawaii  2000 
 
No cap 1 3 S 
Idaho  1984 
 
5% (R)  1 1 S 
Illinois  2000 
 
5% (R)  2 1 S 
Indiana  1982 
 
7% (R)  4 4 S 
Iowa  1992 Yes 2.5% (R)  1 1 S 
Kansas  No Fund C 
Kentucky  1983 
 
5% (R)  3 1 S 
Louisiana  1990 Yes 4% (R)  2 1 C 
Maine  1986 
 
12% (R)  2 1 S 
Maryland  1985 Yes 7.5% (R)  2 1 S 
Massachusetts  1986 
 
15% (R)  3 1 S 
Michigan  1977 Yes 10% (R)  4 4 S 
Minnesota  1981 
 
$1.3 billion 1 1 S 
Mississippi  1982 
 
7.5% (E) 1 1 S 
Missouri  1992 
 
7.5% (E) 1 1 C 
Montana  No Fund S 
Nebraska  1983 Yes No cap 2 2 C 
Nevada  1994 
 
15% (E) 4 2 S 
New Hampshire  1987 
 
10% of revenue 2 2 S 
New Jersey  1990 
  
5% (R)  2 2 S 
New Mexico  1978 
 
No cap 2 1 S 
New York  1945 Yes 3% (E) 4 2 S 
North Carolina  1991 
 
No cap 2 1 S 
North Dakota  1987 
 
5% (E) 2 4 S 
Ohio  1981 
 
5% (R)  2 1 S 
Oklahoma  1985 
 
10% (R)  2 3 C 
Oregon  2007 
 
7.5% (R)  2 3 S 
Pennsylvania  1985 
 
6% (R)  2 3 S 
Rhode Island  1985 Yes 3% (R)  1 2 S 
South Carolina  1978 Yes 3% (R)  3 2 C 
South Dakota  1991 
 
10% (E) 2 2 S 
Tennessee  1972 
 
5% (E) 3 2 S 
Texas  1987 
 
10% (R)  2 2 S 
Utah  1986 Yes 6% (E) 2 2 S 
Vermont  1988 
 
5% (E) 2 2 S 
Virginia  1992 
 
10% (E) 4 4 C 
Washington  1981 
 
10% (R)  2 3 S 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
West Virginia  1994 
 
10% (E) 2 2 S 
Wisconsin  1981 
 
5% (E) 3 2 S 
Wyoming  1982   No cap 1 1 S 
Deposit Rules Withdrawal Rules 
  1= legislative 
appropriation 1= legislative appropriation 
 2= if budget 
surplus 2= budget deficit 
  3= if positive 
revenue 
growth 3= supermajority legislative vote 
 4= formula 
based 4= formula based     
Note: (E) of expenditures, (R) of revenues.  
Source: Drawn from Wagner (2004), McNichol and Boadi (2011), and National Conference of State 
Legislators primer on Rainy Day Funds at 
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/BudgetTax/StateBudgetStabilizationFundsSpring2008/tabid/12630/De
fault.aspx. 
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Table A.2: Volatility Scores for Corporate Income Tax Revenue and Unemployment 
Rate 
  
Corporate 
Income Tax 
Volatility 
Score 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Volatility 
Score 
Alabama 1.86% 1.16 0.40% 0.95 
Alaska 5.83% 3.63 0.30% 0.71 
Arizona 1.57% 0.98 0.60% 1.43 
Arkansas 2.38% 1.48 0.40% 0.95 
California 4.64% 2.89 1.10% 2.62 
Colorado 1.81% 1.12 0.80% 1.90 
Connecticut 2.32% 1.44 1.10% 2.62 
Delaware 1.97% 1.23 0.10% 0.24 
Florida 2.51% 1.57 0.90% 2.14 
Georgia 1.88% 1.17 0.40% 0.95 
Hawaii 0.83% 0.52 0.00% 0.00 
Idaho 1.46% 0.91 1.40% 3.33 
Illinois 2.44% 1.52 0.50% 1.19 
Indiana 2.00% 1.25 0.30% 0.71 
Iowa 1.12% 0.70 0.10% 0.24 
Kansas 2.48% 1.54 0.00% 0.00 
Kentucky 1.68% 1.05 0.10% 0.24 
Louisiana 1.43% 0.89 0.90% 2.14 
Maine 2.13% 1.32 0.10% 0.24 
Maryland 2.86% 1.78 0.40% 0.95 
Massachusetts 4.35% 2.71 0.10% 0.24 
Michigan 1.20% 0.75 0.70% 1.67 
Minnesota 2.29% 1.43 0.70% 1.67 
Mississippi 1.82% 1.13 1.10% 2.62 
Missouri 0.79% 0.49 0.00% 0.00 
Montana 1.55% 0.97 0.80% 1.90 
Nebraska 1.78% 1.11 0.00% 0.00 
Nevada 0.00% 1.00 2.10% 5.00 
New Hampshire 8.03% 5.00 0.10% 0.24 
New Jersey 4.00% 2.49 0.60% 1.43 
New Mexico 0.89% 0.56 1.10% 2.62 
New York 2.78% 1.73 0.30% 0.71 
North Carolina 2.94% 1.83 0.40% 0.95 
North Dakota 1.63% 1.02 0.30% 0.71 
Ohio 0.25% 0.15 0.10% 0.24 
Oklahoma 1.11% 0.69 0.20% 0.48 
Oregon 1.86% 1.16 0.40% 0.95 
Pennsylvania 2.58% 1.61 0.50% 1.19 
Rhode Island 1.72% 1.07 0.80% 1.90 
South Carolina 0.69% 0.43 0.30% 0.71 
South Dakota 0.78% 0.49 0.20% 0.48 
Tennessee 3.53% 2.20 0.70% 1.67 
Texas 0.00% 1.00 0.70% 1.67 
Utah 1.86% 1.16 0.40% 0.95 
Vermont 1.60% 0.99 0.50% 1.19 
Virginia 2.13% 1.33 0.00% 1.00 
Washington 0.00% 1.00 0.50% 1.19 
West Virginia 3.17% 1.97 0.80% 1.90 
Wisconsin 2.76% 1.72 0.20% 0.48 
Wyoming 0.00% 1.00 0.70% 1.67 
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Table A.3: Volatility Scores for Federal Revenue, Gambling Revenue, and Medicaid 
Expenditures 
  
Federal 
Revenue 
Volatility 
Score 
Gambling 
Revenue 
Volatility 
Score 
Medicaid 
Expenditures 
Volatility 
Score 
Alabama 34.81% 4.15 0.00% 0.00 1.14% 0.31 
Alaska 25.00% 2.98 0.08% 0.04 3.10% 0.85 
Arizona 39.39% 4.70 0.54% 0.30 3.60% 0.98 
Arkansas 30.00% 3.58 0.62% 0.35 3.47% 0.95 
California 24.29% 2.90 0.54% 0.30 4.01% 1.10 
Colorado 22.86% 2.73 1.03% 0.58 4.05% 1.11 
Connecticut 22.96% 2.74 3.24% 1.82 14.05% 3.84 
Delaware 25.00% 2.98 4.58% 2.57 6.15% 1.68 
Florida 27.17% 3.24 1.96% 1.10 3.46% 0.95 
Georgia 35.56% 4.24 2.43% 1.36 3.74% 1.02 
Hawaii 21.67% 2.59 0.00% 0.00 4.46% 1.22 
Idaho 30.34% 3.62 0.58% 0.33 3.38% 0.92 
Illinois 26.03% 3.11 2.06% 1.15 4.42% 1.21 
Indiana 27.78% 3.31 3.53% 1.98 3.34% 0.91 
Iowa 31.90% 3.81 2.05% 1.15 3.15% 0.86 
Kansas 27.06% 3.23 0.49% 0.27 4.30% 1.18 
Kentucky 33.70% 4.02 0.97% 0.54 2.79% 0.76 
Louisiana 40.63% 4.85 2.95% 1.65 2.37% 0.65 
Maine 33.68% 4.02 1.01% 0.57 4.24% 1.16 
Maryland 29.73% 3.55 1.70% 0.95 5.33% 1.46 
Massachusetts 26.00% 3.10 2.13% 1.20 18.29% 5.00 
Michigan 30.30% 3.62 1.49% 0.84 2.27% 0.62 
Minnesota 25.00% 2.98 0.40% 0.23 7.23% 1.98 
Mississippi 41.90% 5.00 0.90% 0.50 0.69% 0.19 
Missouri 35.29% 4.21 2.48% 1.39 4.62% 1.26 
Montana 35.21% 4.20 1.01% 0.57 1.94% 0.53 
Nebraska 32.00% 3.82 0.42% 0.24 5.55% 1.52 
Nevada 20.71% 2.47 8.91% 5.00 3.60% 0.98 
New Hampshire 30.77% 3.67 1.09% 0.61 5.00% 1.37 
New Jersey 22.39% 2.67 2.33% 1.31 5.77% 1.58 
New Mexico 34.44% 4.11 0.83% 0.46 3.15% 0.86 
New York 28.00% 3.34 1.93% 1.08 3.61% 0.99 
North Carolina 28.07% 3.35 1.01% 0.56 4.44% 1.21 
North Dakota 27.87% 3.33 0.28% 0.16 3.76% 1.03 
Ohio 24.44% 2.92 1.29% 0.72 11.22% 3.07 
Oklahoma 33.33% 3.98 0.58% 0.32 3.26% 0.89 
Oregon 23.79% 2.84 2.86% 1.60 3.00% 0.82 
Pennsylvania 25.30% 3.02 3.52% 1.97 6.53% 1.78 
Rhode Island 34.09% 4.07 4.83% 2.71 8.71% 2.38 
South Carolina 27.24% 3.25 1.33% 0.75 1.83% 0.50 
South Dakota 40.00% 4.77 3.20% 1.80 5.08% 1.39 
Tennessee 36.67% 4.38 1.28% 0.72 5.50% 1.50 
Texas 34.17% 4.08 1.10% 0.62 5.60% 1.53 
Utah 27.50% 3.28 0.00% 0.00 1.41% 0.38 
Vermont 31.67% 3.78 0.39% 0.22 2.57% 0.70 
Virginia 21.30% 2.54 1.16% 0.65 5.96% 1.63 
Washington 25.00% 2.98 0.38% 0.21 8.12% 2.22 
West Virginia 31.43% 3.75 5.05% 2.83 2.04% 0.56 
Wisconsin 20.83% 2.49 0.57% 0.32 3.54% 0.97 
Wyoming 33.78% 4.03 0.00% 0.00 3.40% 0.93 
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Table A.4: State Total Tax Revenue Time Trend Forecast Results (in millions) 
  Year S.E. Constant S.E. R-squared 
.Alabama 264.26*** (53.40) 6038.57*** (362.21) 0.73 
.Alaska 534.44*** (157.27) -239.17 (1066.66) 0.56 
.Arizona 461.47** (162.41) 7824.24*** (1101.53) 0.47 
.Arkansas 317.80*** (37.07) 4364.41*** (251.42) 0.89 
.California 3299.09*** (925.64) 76993.19*** (6278.00) 0.59 
.Colorado 243.35*** (61.70) 6498.60*** (418.44) 0.63 
.Connecticut 397.63*** (93.19) 8912.47*** (632.04) 0.67 
.Delaware 93.86*** (15.55) 1961.13*** (105.46) 0.80 
.Florida 1154.90** (394.43) 24436.42*** (2675.13) 0.49 
.Georgia 347.50** (132.80) 13325.65*** (900.70) 0.43 
.Hawaii 196.61*** (31.78) 3077.07*** (215.56) 0.81 
.Idaho 112.27*** (29.65) 2198.02*** (201.07) 0.61 
.Illinois 882.26*** (187.75) 20863.43*** (1273.35) 0.71 
.Indiana 545.33*** (67.31) 9281.53*** (456.53) 0.88 
.Iowa 228.01*** (30.73) 4496.77*** (208.45) 0.86 
.Kansas 244.27*** (38.26) 4360.66*** (259.49) 0.82 
.Kentucky 248.67*** (35.15) 7446.01*** (238.43) 0.85 
.Louisiana 393.13*** (90.87) 6330.85*** (616.33) 0.68 
.Maine 122.93*** (21.32) 2435.59*** (144.57) 0.79 
.Maryland 615.13*** (64.63) 9439.51*** (438.35) 0.91 
.Massachusetts 580.53*** (128.56) 14754.06*** (871.94) 0.69 
.Michigan 102.22 (79.77) 22397.01*** (541.00) 0.24 
.Minnesota 539.27*** (81.29) 12444.86*** (551.31) 0.83 
.Mississippi 223.24*** (29.36) 4269.99*** (199.11) 0.87 
.Missouri 212.12*** (49.47) 8294.98*** (335.49) 0.67 
.Montana 113.81*** (17.05) 1207.34*** (115.63) 0.83 
.Nebraska 123.41*** (22.28) 2888.43*** (151.10) 0.77 
.Nevada 273.71*** (50.14) 3454.52*** (340.07) 0.77 
.New Hampshire 47.35*** (7.05) 1721.99*** (47.79) 0.83 
.New Jersey 1198.92*** (220.65) 16477.85*** (1496.55) 0.77 
.New Mexico 148.73*** (46.73) 3521.54*** (316.94) 0.53 
.New York 2799.10*** (344.58) 36237.9*** (2337.06) 0.88 
.North Carolina 816.58*** (128.77) 13813.76*** (873.34) 0.82 
.North Dakota 159.59*** (21.06) 682.55*** (142.81) 0.86 
.Ohio 615.69*** (139.84) 19149.61*** (948.41) 0.68 
.Oklahoma 238.90*** (55.97) 5565.03*** (379.62) 0.67 
.Oregon 219.53*** (50.90) 5278.72*** (345.22) 0.67 
.Pennsylvania 1067.98*** (142.38) 20430.67*** (965.68) 0.86 
.Rhode Island 66.19*** (14.85) 2069*** (100.75) 0.69 
.South Carolina 201.94*** (56.73) 5987.71*** (384.76) 0.58 
.South Dakota 45.26*** (3.42) 863.16*** (23.18) 0.95 
.Tennessee 372.19*** (65.40) 7445.47*** (443.59) 0.78 
.Texas 1710.89*** (267.10) 24440.75*** (1811.55) 0.82 
.Utah 209.34*** (50.10) 3561.52*** (339.83) 0.66 
.Vermont 133.45*** (17.57) 1258.76*** (119.16) 0.87 
.Virginia 581.63*** (124.55) 11867.68*** (844.74) 0.71 
.Washington 550.98*** (101.28) 11617.88*** (686.90) 0.77 
.West Virginia 171.84*** (19.51) 3103.18*** (132.32) 0.90 
.Wisconsin 317.54*** (51.42) 11371.70*** (348.75) 0.81 
.Wyoming 168.08*** (21.99) 725.75*** (149.12) 0.87 
***p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.10     
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Table A.5: State Total Tax Revenue Time Trend Squared Forecast Results (in 
millions) 
  Year S.E. Year^2 S.E. Constant S.E. R-squared 
.Alabama 477.908* (17.80) -17.80 19.28  5575.66*** 620.21  0.76 
.Alaska 34.85 (713.19) 41.63 (57.89) 846.27 (1862.07) 0.59 
.Arizona 1660.94** (622.84) -99.96* (50.55) 5225.39** (1626.19) 0.65 
.Arkansas 453.64** (166.30) -11.32 (13.50) 4070.09*** (434.19) 0.90 
.California 5231.91 (4273.99) -161.07 (346.90) 72805.43*** (11159.00) 0.60 
.Colorado 187.36 (287.97) 4.67 (23.37) 6619.92*** (751.86) 0.64 
.Connecticut 511.26 (434.09) -9.47 (35.23) 8666.26*** (1133.37) 0.67 
.Delaware 167.53** (67.67) -6.14 (5.49) 1801.51*** (176.67) 0.83 
.Florida 4572.88*** (1366.28) -284.83** (110.89) 17030.78*** (3567.23) 0.72 
.Georgia 1128.52* (552.95) -65.08 (44.88) 11633.44*** (1443.70) 0.55 
.Hawaii 362.65** (135.96) -13.84 (11.03) 2717.30*** (354.97) 0.84 
.Idaho 229.09 (132.08) -9.74 (10.72) 1944.90*** (344.84) 0.65 
.Illinois 1,281.34 (866.46) -33.26 (70.33) 19998.76*** (2262.25) 0.72 
.Indiana 936.68*** (281.11) -32.61 (22.82) 8433.61*** (733.94) 0.90 
.Iowa 45.84 (127.70) 15.18 (10.36) 4891.47*** (333.42) 0.89 
.Kansas 294.31 (178.10) -4.17 (14.46) 4252.25*** (465.01) 0.82 
.Kentucky 498.59*** (137.21) -20.83* (11.14) 6904.52*** (358.26) 0.89 
.Louisiana 942.59** (375.52) -45.79 (30.48) 5140.35*** (980.45) 0.75 
.Maine 219.18** (93.42) -8.02 (7.58) 2227.03*** (243.91) 0.81 
.Maryland 860.89** (288.96) -20.48 (23.45) 8907.04*** (754.44) 0.92 
.Massachusetts 535.55 (601.33) 3.75 (48.81) 14851.52*** (1570.01) 0.69 
.Michigan 580.13 (330.47) -39.83 (26.82) 21361.53*** (862.83) 0.34 
.Minnesota 917.81** (354.66) -31.54 (28.79) 11624.70*** (925.99) 0.85 
.Mississippi 260.68* (136.69) -3.12 (11.09) 4188.88*** (356.89) 0.87 
.Missouri 432.41* (217.20) -18.36 (17.63) 7817.69*** (567.10) 0.71 
.Montana 149.38* (78.72) -2.96 (6.39) 1130.26*** (205.53) 0.84 
.Nebraska 323.84*** (74.65) -16.70** (6.06) 2454.16*** (194.91) 0.88 
.Nevada 655.03*** (189.43) -31.78* -15.38 2628.33*** (494.59) 0.85 
.New Hampshire 118.69*** (20.41) -5.95*** (1.66) 1567.42*** (53.28) 0.94 
.New Jersey 2226.42** (962.75) -85.63 (78.14) 14251.59*** (2513.64) 0.80 
.New Mexico 359.87 (204.78) -17.59 (16.62) 3064.07*** (534.67) 0.59 
.New York 2,053.07 (1589.43) 62.17 (129.00) 37854.30*** (4149.86) 0.88 
.North Carolina 1141.38* (590.87) -27.07 (47.96) 13110.04*** (1542.70) 0.82 
.North Dakota -90.20** (38.54) 20.82*** (3.13) 1223.77*** (100.63) 0.98 
.Ohio 1805.86*** (491.40) -99.18** (39.88) 16570.91*** (1282.99) 0.82 
.Oklahoma 441.31 (251.38) -16.87 (20.40) 5126.47*** (656.34) 0.70 
.Oregon 292.44 (236.69) -6.07 (19.21) 5120.77*** (617.98) 0.68 
.Pennsylvania 1560.52** (641.78) -41.05 (52.09) 19363.49*** (1675.64) 0.87 
.Rhode Island 200.66*** (49.48) -11.21** (4.02) 1777.64*** (129.19) 0.84 
.South Carolina 472.01* (246.68) -22.51 (20.02) 5402.56*** (644.06) 0.64 
.South Dakota 45.17** (16.00) 0.01 (1.30) 863.34*** (41.76) 0.95 
.Tennessee 898.97*** (238.94) -43.90* (19.39) 6304.11*** (623.84) 0.87 
.Texas 1,641.72 (1249.54) 5.76 (101.42) 24590.62*** (3262.43) 0.82 
.Utah 364.96 (227.54) -12.97 (18.47) 3224.33*** 594.08  0.68 
.Vermont 196.62** (78.94) -5.26 (6.41) 1121.89*** (206.11) 0.88 
.Virginia 1277.53** (525.19) -57.99 (42.63) 10359.90*** (1371.23) 0.76 
.Washington 986.14* (446.79) -36.26 (36.26) 10675.03*** (1166.52) 0.79 
.West Virginia 259.94** (85.50) -7.34 (6.94) 2912.29*** (223.24) 0.91 
.Wisconsin 235.52 (238.75) 6.83 (19.38) 11549.39*** (623.36) 0.81 
.Wyoming 216.39* (101.38) -4.03 (8.23) 621.10** (264.68) 0.87 
***p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.10       
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Table A.6: Hausman Test Results 
Variable (beta) Fixed (Beta) Random (b-B) Difference Sqrt S.E. 
Rainy Day Fund 52.85 57.50 -4.65 4.90 
Individual Income Tax Revenue 30.72 5.82 24.90 8.93 
Corporate Income Tax Revenue 74.66 26.59 48.07 10.47 
Sales Tax Revenue 0.07 4.11 -4.03 9.22 
Individual Income Tax Reliance 2.96 -1.11 4.07 1.61 
Sales Tax Reliance 0.23 1.70 -1.46 0.62 
Log Per Capita Income -8.30 0.56 -8.87 1.75 
Economic Base Diversification -70.98 -6.47 -64.52 34.11 
Manufacturing 5.13 3.95 1.18 23.83 
Government  -179.77 -2.67 -177.10 36.35 
Real Estate 92.91 -9.75 102.66 39.36 
Retail Trade 36.54 -1.04 37.58 44.68 
Finance -42.32 -8.26 -34.06 28.17 
Log Population 6.96 -0.14 7.11 5.67 
Governor -0.30 1.39 -1.70 0.46 
House 0.73 0.76 -0.02 0.34 
Senate -0.69 -0.08 -0.61 0.36 
Government Ideology 0.01 -0.05 0.06 0.01 
Citizen Ideology 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.02 
Chi2(17)=161.42; Prob>chi2<0.0001       
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Figure B.1: Unemployment Rate, 1948-2012 
 
Sources: Federal Reserve Economic Data, St. Louis Fed and NBER 
 
 
Figure B.2: Long Term Unemployment Rate, 1979-2010 
 
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, NBER 
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Table B.1: Hausman Test Results 
Variable (beta) Fixed (Beta) Random (b-B) Difference Sqrt S.E. 
Real Taxable Wage Base 0.0065 0.0077 -0.0011 0.0004 
Real Average Weekly Benefit -0.0440 -0.0448 0.0008 0.0036 
Average Tax Rate -11.0700 -9.6595 -1.4105 0.1466 
Average Duration of Benefits -0.0110 -0.0097 -0.0013 . 
Citizen Ideology -0.0181 0.0270 -0.0451 0.0069 
Government Ideology -0.1032 -0.0689 -0.0343 . 
Senate 0.0152 0.0136 0.0016 . 
House 0.0038 -0.0006 0.0045 . 
Governor 0.0363 0.0262 0.0101 . 
Unemployment Rate -1.9507 -2.0413 0.0906 0.0183 
Log Real GDP Per Capita 0.1915 0.2314 -0.0400 0.0187 
Manufacturing 0.2190 0.2053 0.0137 0.0474 
Retail Trade 2.0674 2.2073 -0.1399 0.0816 
Finance 0.0509 -0.0241 0.0751 0.0707 
Real Estate -0.7231 -0.4836 -0.2395 0.0992 
Government 0.0098 0.1899 -0.1800 0.1684 
Chi2(17)=59.48; Prob>chi2<0.001     
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